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On Power and Violence: Arendt contra Fanon
Elizabeth Frazer (New College, Oxford) and Kimberly Hutchings (London School of Economics)
APSA Conference Panel,
‘Power, Violence and the Body’,
Philadelphia, 31 August – 3
rd
September 2006
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Introduction
The aim of this paper is to address the question of how to theorize the relation between violence
and politics. According to some strands of thought, such as those associated with Machiavelli, Hobbes,
and Weber, politics is about power and power relies on violence as its key instrument. Another
tradition of thinking about violence and politics, associated with Sorel, Sartre and Fanon, focuses on the
existential significance of violence for both oppressors and oppressed, but also the necessary,
instrumental role of violence in revolutionary movements. Yet another distinct strand of thought holds
that violence and politics are antithetical to one another. This strand is articulated and promoted most
clearly by Arendt, who famously defines violence in anti‐political terms. In this paper we consider
Arendt’s theory of violence and politics in particular comparison with Fanon’s.
In her essay On Violence, Arendt explicitly engages with Fanon’s work and the broader tradition
with which she identifies it. We will argue that Arendt’s critique of Fanon offers significant insights into
problems both with instrumental justifications of violence and with the identification of violence with
organic, libidinal energy. At the same time, however, we suggest that Arendt’s analysis is only partially
persuasive and that this is because she insists on viewing violence as a tool in distinction from the
embodied subjects that suffer or wield it. In contrast, Fanon has a much better grasp of how violence
operates in politics not simply as a tool but also as an institutionalised source of meaning and mode of
discourse in which embodied subjects are always already embedded. At stake for both Fanon’s and
Arendt’s analysis is the possibility of a politics without violence. In spite of this, however, we conclude
that neither Fanon nor Arendt engages sufficiently with the presuppositions of violence as a political
technique and how they might be challenged and transformed.