At its most basic, the Christian allegiance to the precept of eternal life renders the
element of the tragic embedded in value pluralism an illusion. This is not to say that there
are not exceptionally difficult choices for the Christian, but rather that there is always a
right answer to even the most traumatic of moral decisions. As far as the Christian is
concerned then, the “liberal value-pluralist” who sees deep incommensurability in the
world and, hence, tragic dilemmas as built into its very fabric is to be prayed for and
pitied. Compare this assertion now to the one Galston puts forward on behalf of Daniel
Weinstock that he finds “attractive” but “incomplete” which captures as well as anyone
could the idea of liberalism as a philosophy of life.
Now consider two ideal-typical figures, Liberal and Traditional. Liberal
lives her life in full awareness of the truth of value pluralism. She knows
that her way of life, although a source of meaning and satisfaction, is but
one among many defensible lives she might have led under other
circumstances. She understands that she life represents what may be
termed a selection of value; even if she inherits that life from her parents
or community without systematic reflection on alternatives to it, she
understands that continued identification with it is in some real sense a
choice. By contrast, to the extent that he is even aware of ways of life
other than his own, Traditional regards them as inferior or even
contemptible. He doe not see his own way of life as a choice, and because
he believes that there is only one right way to live, he sees no particular
value in the fact of individuals’ identification with ways of life other than
his.
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Convention