scholars like Galston), the field is again opened up for meaningful conversations about
the “best life” and the “best political regime” in a way that has, at least seemingly, not
been possible in America for most of its history (see Hartz, 1988). In such a brave new
more fully democratic world, Christians and their message will once again have a chance
to carry the day. And, given their own belief that their revelation is true, they have good
reason to hope that it will ultimately do so. Liberalism, on the other hand benefits too
insofar as it will ultimately either have earned its hegemonic position fairly and on a
legitimate playing field, or because it will be relieved of the philosophical burden that it
has tried to sustain and returned to a more limited but effective role as a form of
governance rather than a philosophy of life. I have little optimism that either side will
find this approach fulfilling, nor do I think that modern men and women have the
patience for the sort of deep debate and general messiness this would mean for the
political world—there is a reason we have turned over so many of the most important
political questions of our polity to nine unelected members of the Supreme Court—rather
than allowing the democratic process with all its potential for agon to play itself out.
Shelter from the Storm: A Conclusion
My lack of optimism, first and foremost comes from the deeply entrenched nature
of the liberal worldview and the strong grip of postmodernism in its “hypermodern” form
as an orientation—unreflective though it mostly is—among the modern men and women
of the contemporary United States, and other parts of the West. However, as I have tried
to demonstrate it is not the “value-pluralists” of good faith who are the real problem.
They at least are being true to themselves and in the case of people like William Galston,
honest and forthright in their positions. The real problem today comes from people like
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Convention