thesis retains important metaphoric power (see Fukuyama 1992), and its proto-American
theorist, Louis Hartz (1988), remains persuasive, though not conclusive, we are still faced
with those anomalies whom he characterized as a “frustrated aristocracy” of citizens
“Aristotelian-like, trying to break out of the confines of middle class life” (1988, 8) who
for various reasons reject the comfort and safety offered by the liberal state as sufficient
goods in and of themselves in the name of other more demanding and risky values. While
the occasional would-be Nietzschean has graced the American stage, along with other
individuals and groups who have attempted to free themselves from the velvet handcuffs
of the American liberal state, only the Christians possess the shear numbers and power, if
aligned, to really provoke and sustain radical change in the context of democratic
That they are relatively dormant and compliant within the established
order should come as no surprise to the extent that it is their order, however, the
domesticated appearance and behavior should not be take for granted. When challenged
too directly, the person of faith will and, indeed, should push back. Compliance is
mistaken as complicity at great risk.
In his essay, “Liberalism’s Religion Problem,” Stephen Carter (2002) deftly and
succinctly captures the essence of the dilemma an activist Christianity creates for the
liberal state.
However, while that similarity is not merely coincidental, it cannot be taken
for granted. As he so aptly puts it: “from the Christian point of view, however, these
commitments [liberal commitments], while important, are insufficient. The first and
highest duty of the individual Christian believer is to Christ” (2002, 23). Christianity not
only requires more of its believers than liberalism asks, it may be the case that it requires
more than liberalism can allow. As Carter himself puts it: “The liberal state is
uncomfortable with deep religious devotion. . . Religious belief is reduced to precise
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