Fineman’s use of the economic imagery of “debt” somewhat muddies the waters
in characterizing the nature of the state’s responsibility. Fineman suggests that the state
and employers “owe” parents support for caretaking because the state and the market
institutions that it protects and fosters are dependent on the caretaking labor that
reproduces society and populates its institutions. In Fineman’s words, “[c]aretaking thus
creates a ‘social debt,’ a debt that must be paid according to principles of equality that
demand that those receiving social benefits also share the costs when they are able.” She
argues that under current public policy, however, the state and the market are “free-
riders,” appropriating the labor of the caretaker for their own purposes.
Fineman’s framing the state’s responsibility in terms of debt, however, raises
several thorny issues. First, it suggests that caretakers deserve subsidies because of the
net benefits that children will bring to society at a future point. Yet, even if we accept
Fineman’s contention that children’s contributions to society should be credited to their
parents, the conclusion that children are a net benefit to society does not necessarily
follow. Determining whether children should indeed be considered a net benefit requires
assessing whether children’s future contributions exceed their costs to society. For
example, opponents of state support might argue that the ecological, social, and psychic
costs from overcrowding outweigh the benefits of children. In addition, if debts are
going to be paid off by the state, should there be a corresponding offset for the unique
benefits to parents of having children – benefits that are evidently so substantial that a
large proportion of children are deliberately conceived even without the promise of
subsidies?
Further, grounding public support on the assertion that children are a net future
asset to society produces some unpalatable results. For example, this line of reasoning
9
Convention