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U.S. Presidents and Foreign Policy Mistakes in the Exercise of Power: Conceptual and Empirical Perspectives
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rankings of the other player in making an optimal rational choice.
4
However, it requires
accurate information about the other player’s preference rankings. The risk exists of a misdiagnosis and a prescription for choosing Cooperation or Conflict that results in a suboptimal outcome for one or both players.
OTHER
OTHER
CO
CF
CO
CF
CO
4,3 1,4
CO
Mutual Self Submits/
Settlement Other Dominates
SELF
SELF
CF
2,1
3,2*
CF
Self Dominates/
Mutual
Other Submits
Deadlock
*A Nash myopic equilibrium is asterisked and a Pareto-optimal, non-myopic equilibrium is underlined (See Game 27 in Brams 1994: 217).
This requirement has made the rationality criterion more difficult to implement in
practice (Simon 1957; Fiske and Taylor 1991; Geva and Mintz 1997). However, we do not reject it here and instead suggest remedial strategies below for using it in the face of these obstacles. As we have argued above, decision makers are likely to follow the rationality criterion within the external and internal boundaries, respectively, set by the availability of accurate information and the limitations of the human mind in processing whatever information is available (Mintz 2004; Lake and Powell 1999). The “bounded rationality” notion, in which decision makers make choices based on their beliefs and biases, is still a process characterized by self and other attributions and inferences about preferences based on those beliefs. A recognition that these beliefs and their implications may not be true is reason for caution but not despair unless there is no way to avoid or mitigate mistakes based on diagnostic and prescriptive errors. Solutions for avoiding foreign policy mistakes fall into four general categories. They include moral/ethical solutions, generic design solutions, actor-specific solutions, and theoretical solutions.
Moral/ethical solutions involve steps to insure that leaders are held accountable
for their decisions, especially if they violate laws or societal norms. Democratic political theory prescribes that leaders who desire to remain in office must stand for election at regular intervals and run on their records. Democratic leaders who have made mistakes are presumably more vulnerable to removal from office and, therefore, may be less likely to make risky or illicit decisions for war leading to foreign policy failures. Empirically, there is some support for this view in the democratic peace literature although the scope of this generalization does not appear to extend to other kinds of public policy failures (Maoz 1998; Russett and Starr 2000; Bueno De Mesquita, Smith, Siverson and Morrow 2003). However, it still appears that decision makers who are accountable to others do
4
An outcome that is better for all players or at least better for one player without being worse for the other
player is called a Pareto-optimal solution or outcome in the parlance of game theory (see Brams 1994: 324-325 and Morrow 1996).
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| | Authors: Walker, Stephen. and Malici, Akan. |
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28
rankings of the other player in making an optimal rational choice.
4
However, it requires
accurate information about the other player’s preference rankings. The risk exists of a
misdiagnosis and a prescription for choosing Cooperation or Conflict that results in a
suboptimal outcome for one or both players.
OTHER
OTHER
CO
CF
CO
CF
CO
4,3 1,4
CO
Mutual Self Submits/
Settlement Other Dominates
SELF
SELF
CF
2,1
3,2*
CF
Self Dominates/
Mutual
Other Submits
Deadlock
*A Nash myopic equilibrium is asterisked and a Pareto-optimal, non-myopic equilibrium is underlined (See
Game 27 in Brams 1994: 217).
This requirement has made the rationality criterion more difficult to implement in
practice (Simon 1957; Fiske and Taylor 1991; Geva and Mintz 1997). However, we do
not reject it here and instead suggest remedial strategies below for using it in the face of
these obstacles. As we have argued above, decision makers are likely to follow the
rationality criterion within the external and internal boundaries, respectively, set by the
availability of accurate information and the limitations of the human mind in processing
whatever information is available (Mintz 2004; Lake and Powell 1999). The “bounded
rationality” notion, in which decision makers make choices based on their beliefs and
biases, is still a process characterized by self and other attributions and inferences about
preferences based on those beliefs. A recognition that these beliefs and their implications
may not be true is reason for caution but not despair unless there is no way to avoid or
mitigate mistakes based on diagnostic and prescriptive errors. Solutions for avoiding
foreign policy mistakes fall into four general categories. They include moral/ethical
solutions, generic design solutions, actor-specific solutions, and theoretical solutions.
Moral/ethical solutions involve steps to insure that leaders are held accountable
for their decisions, especially if they violate laws or societal norms. Democratic political
theory prescribes that leaders who desire to remain in office must stand for election at
regular intervals and run on their records. Democratic leaders who have made mistakes
are presumably more vulnerable to removal from office and, therefore, may be less likely
to make risky or illicit decisions for war leading to foreign policy failures. Empirically,
there is some support for this view in the democratic peace literature although the scope
of this generalization does not appear to extend to other kinds of public policy failures
(Maoz 1998; Russett and Starr 2000; Bueno De Mesquita, Smith, Siverson and Morrow
2003). However, it still appears that decision makers who are accountable to others do
4
An outcome that is better for all players or at least better for one player without being worse for the other
player is called a Pareto-optimal solution or outcome in the parlance of game theory (see Brams 1994: 324-
325 and Morrow 1996).
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