discuss this interesting finding at length here.
29
For example, as Alford and Hibbings show in their study, identical twins separated at birth appear to share some
predilections, but it is impossible to predict their personalities.
30
- just as growing up in a violent household encourages low MAOA individuals to become more violent. Just as violence
prone individual may become more violent if they grow up in a violent environment, more self-centered or rationalist
individual may be more self-centered if they grow up on an environment in which they see much self-centered behavior
(perhaps especially if they see this behavior rewarded). Alford and Hibbing similarly suggest, “Acting alone, MAOA
deficiencies or violent childhood have little predictive power, but the interaction of genetic and environmental forces is
disconcertingly powerful,” (p. 717, my emphasis).
31
Once again, Darwin’s “survival of the fittest” theory does not suggest that bigger or that stronger individuals will
necessarily pass on their genes, rather those individuals that “fit” better into their ecological context are more likely to pass
down their genes.
32
See Ehrlich, Human Natures, 2000. (Ehrlich, 2000)
33
The recent ‘historical’ turn in rational choice is an example of this. The key point for these scholars is to show that the
theorized relationship between actors holds in a wide variety of places and times. See, for example, Margaret Levi’s, On
Rule and Revenue, (Levi, 1988) or the widely read volume, Analytic Narratives (Bates et al., 1998). Morris Fiorina
explores the underlying logic of this scientific enterprise in (Fiornina, 1996), see also (Lichbach, 1995). For an insightful
and frank discussion of the epistemological issues dividing political science see (Wallerstein, 2001).
34
Quoted in (Greif and Laitin, 2004)
35
The most important of these are (Pierson, 2000; Pierson, 2004; Steinmo, Thelen, and Longstreth, 1992; Streeck and
Thelen, 2005; Thelen, 2004).
36
Paul Pierson has probably been the most important single scholar pushing this agenda. Many of these concepts have been
introduced to political science (though often drawn from elsewhere) by Pierson. See, (Pierson, 1993; Pierson, 2000;
Pierson, 2004).
37
Note that Kathy Thelen’s award winning book is titled: How Institutions Evolve. Additionally, the substantive chapters
examine changes in the ‘skill formation’ in four different countries. Each of the four chapters is titled, “The Evolution of…
..”
38
Even Gould seems to have moved in this direction in the last years of his life, (Gould, 2002a; Gould, 2002b). It is the term
“equilibrium” that still gives many pause. We do not know Gould’s position on this term, be we argue that it should be used
only as a very general metaphor indicating that slow change. But we see few ‘equilibriums’ in the economic or rational
choice sense in the living world.
39
We also believe that Streek, Thelen are in fact very close to making just the kind of argument we suggest here. For
example, they tell us: “Moreover, rather than emanating on the outside, change is often endogenous and in some cases is
produced by very behavior an institution itself generates” (p. 19).
40
The on-line encyclopedia Wikipedia, offers the following definition for “genetic code”: “The genetic code is a set of
, and is employed in the process of
.”
41
Performance is based on preferences of that political system. Usually we assume performance to be based on economic
growth or the expansion of power; however, it could also be based on other preferences, such as social equity or stability.
42
(Mayr, 2004b)
43
(Farr, 1995: 203)
44
(Zuckerman, 1997: 279)
45
We are aware that modern physics has also moved from these stable assumptions. Not only does Quantum Physics
challenge many of Newton’s basic assumptions, ‘String Theory’ goes even further arguing that it is theoretically not
falsifiable.
46
This is consistent with research that has emerged in mainstream studies recently, such as
47
see for example: Alford, John R., & Hibbing, John R., (2004). “The Origin of Politics: An Evolutionary Theory of
Political Behavior,” Perspectives on Politics, v2(4), & Blank, Robert H., & Hines, Samuel M., (2001). Biology and
Political Science, London: Routledge.
Convention