genome, humans are not simply the sum of their genes—they have emergent qualities as well.
In other words, understanding genes alone will not explain how they interaction with an
organism’s environment. To be sure, dissecting the genome can teach us a great deal about
human physiology, psychology, preferences and diseases, but it does not provide the whole
picture. This implies that, when dealing with macro-level phenomena, social scientists should
be circumspect about what they can predict.
The point here is not simply that life is too complex to be fully understood (even with
ever larger and more sophisticated data sets and computers). Rather, complex systems have
emergent qualities. What this means is that the interaction between constituent units in a
system creates unique properties which cannot be subdivided into or derived from the specific
parts.
This of course does not imply that reductionism is a bad scientific methodology,
and/or it is useless to try to understand the parts that make up the whole. Certainly, most of
the advances in physics, chemistry, medicine, engineering and biology have come from just
such a strategy. The point made by Lewontin and many other evolutionary theorists is that a
system is different than the sum of the parts – no matter how elaborate the algorithm.
Ontological and Epistemological Assumptions in Evolutionary Theory
The previous discussion of evolutionary theory implies a different scientific ontology
than that commonly found in the “hard” sciences. At the root of evolutionary biology is the
assumption that the objects of analysis—living organisms—are fundamentally different than
inanimate matter. Thus, as Ernst Mayer points out, the development of biology as a science
has required an investigation of “additional principles” that applied only to living organisms.
He argues, “This required a restructuring of the conceptual world of science that was far more
fundamental than anyone had imagined at the time” (Mayr, 2004a: 26).
To the extent that
social systems—the object of analysis in political science—are rooted in biology, then this
framework requires one to evaluate an alternative scientific ontology.
First, evolutionary theory relies on the concept of dual causation. This means that
behavior is a function of both environmental constraints and its genetic code. Indeed, this
duality is also evident in the institutionalist literature, as seen in debates about the relative
importance mico-level motivations and macro-level structure. Consequently, an evolutionary
framework would fully support the notion that agents interact and evolve with their
environment.
9
Convention