Author's Keywords: judicial reform, Latin America, judicial independence	Convention All Academic Convention is the premier solution for your association's abstract management solutions needs. Submission - Custom fields, multiple submission types, tracks, audio visual, multiple upload formats, automatic conversion to pdf. Review - Peer Review, Bulk reviewer assignment, bulk emails, ranking, z-score statistics, and multiple worksheets! Reports - Many standard and custom reports generated while you wait. Print programs with participant indexes, event grids, and more! Scheduling - Flexible and convenient grid scheduling within rooms and buildings. Conflict checking and advanced filtering. Communication - Bulk email tools to help your administrators send reminders and responses. Use form letters, a message center, and much more! Management - Search tools, duplicate people management, editing tools, submission transfers, many tools to manage a variety of conference management headaches! Click here for more information.
Association: Name: American Political Science Association URL: http://www.apsanet.org
Citation: URL: http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p151196_index.html Direct Link: HTML Code:

Inclan, Silvia. ""Will judicial independence take hold in Mexico?: Lessons from the region"" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Marriott, Loews Philadelphia, and the Pennsylvania Convention Center, Philadelphia, PA, Aug 31, 2006 <Not Available>. 2011-03-13 <http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p151196_index.html>

Inclan, S. , 2006-08-31 ""Will judicial independence take hold in Mexico?: Lessons from the region"" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Marriott, Loews Philadelphia, and the Pennsylvania Convention Center, Philadelphia, PA Online <APPLICATION/PDF>. 2011-03-13 from http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p151196_index.html

Publication Type: Proceeding Abstract: In 1994 the then Mexican president Ernesto Zedillo launched a judicial reform aimed at increasing the independence and relative power of the judicial branch. The Mexican reform is framed within the 1990�s process of democratization in Latin America, in which thirteen nations engaged in similar projects, which promised to put an end to the historical dependence and fragility of the region�s judicial branches. A decade after the initiation of judicial reforms in the region, the fate and survival of the projects variegates. Some, the Mexican among them, have so far survived, been fully implemented and used, but in other countries some parts of the reforms were delayed, as was the case in Argentina, and in other nations the projects were reversed and failed as was the case in Peru and Ecuador. As delayed and failed experiences with judicial reform demonstrate, executive powers have a natural incentive to reduce judicial independence, regardless of their political ideology and party affiliation. When granted the opportunity to change institutions, they will do so in a strategy to maximize its present and future power. What political factors account for immediate and delayed implementation, reform survival, reversal or failure? This paper revises the Argentinean, Peruvian, Ecuadorian and Mexican experiences with judicial reform. Its explores the extent to which electoral incentives and divided governments explain executive power and incentives and capabilities for and against judicial independence at the initiation and implementation stages of reform. Its aim is to gauge the relative fragility/strength of judicial independence in Mexico and to further our understanding of the process of democratic institution building and democratic consolidation in the region.

The Limits of Judicial Independence: The Supreme Court's Constitutional Rulings,1987-2000

The Relative (Un)Importance of Rehnquist Court Rulings:The Dynamics of Supreme Court Decisions Under Weakened Party Regimes