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Ballot Structure, Political Corruption and the Performance of Proportional Representation
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Ballot Structure, Political Corruption and the Performance of
Proportional Representation
Daniel W. Gingerich
*
Center for the Study of Democratic Politics
Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs
Robertson Hall
Princeton University
Princeton, NJ 08544-1013
ABSTRACT
This paper develops a formal model to evaluate the consequences of differences in ballot structure on corruption related to the financing of politics. The model, which utilizes a principal agent framework with hidden knowledge, explicitly considers how the difference between open-list proportional representation (OLPR) and closed-list proportional representation (CLPR) may facilitate or impede corrupt 'contracts' from forming between party leaders and militants in the public administration. Contrary to standard perspectives in political science, we conclude that ballot structure may have an ambiguous effect on political corruption. A change in electoral structure from CLPR to OLPR will amplify legislative candidates’ demand for electoral resources generated by corruption but will simultaneously make extraction of resources from the State more difficult, thereby generating countervailing causal effects which cancel each other out. Consequently, the overall effect of ballot structure on political corruption is not one of frequency or volume, but rather one of form. "Prepared for delivery at the 2006 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, August 30th-September 3, 2006. Copyright by the American Political Science Association." *The author would like to thank Jorge Domínguez, Peter Hall, Steven Levitsky, Allison Post, David Samuels, Gilles Serra and participants in the Harvard Government Department’s Latin America lunch for offering their comments on various drafts of this manuscript. The author would also like to thank Gary Cox, Scott Desposato and Matthew Shugart for helpful feedback on the arguments contained herein. As always, any errors or omissions are mine alone.
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| | Authors: Gingerich, Daniel. |
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Ballot Structure, Political Corruption and the Performance of
Proportional Representation
Daniel W. Gingerich
*
Center for the Study of Democratic Politics
Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs
Robertson Hall
Princeton University
Princeton, NJ 08544-1013
ABSTRACT
This paper develops a formal model to evaluate the consequences of differences in ballot
structure on corruption related to the financing of politics. The model, which utilizes a principal
agent framework with hidden knowledge, explicitly considers how the difference between open-
list proportional representation (OLPR) and closed-list proportional representation (CLPR) may
facilitate or impede corrupt 'contracts' from forming between party leaders and militants in the
public administration. Contrary to standard perspectives in political science, we conclude that
ballot structure may have an ambiguous effect on political corruption. A change in electoral
structure from CLPR to OLPR will amplify legislative candidates’ demand for electoral resources
generated by corruption but will simultaneously make extraction of resources from the State more
difficult, thereby generating countervailing causal effects which cancel each other out.
Consequently, the overall effect of ballot structure on political corruption is not one of frequency
or volume, but rather one of form.
"Prepared for delivery at the 2006 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science
Association, August 30th-September 3, 2006. Copyright by the American Political Science
Association."
*The author would like to thank Jorge Domínguez, Peter Hall, Steven Levitsky, Allison Post, David
Samuels, Gilles Serra and participants in the Harvard Government Department’s Latin America lunch for
offering their comments on various drafts of this manuscript. The author would also like to thank Gary
Cox, Scott Desposato and Matthew Shugart for helpful feedback on the arguments contained herein. As
always, any errors or omissions are mine alone.
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