s =
1
2
+ ψ(Ω) − τ
(6)
The function ψ(Ω) represents the electorate’s preference for the platform of party G over that of
party O. The greater the amount of revenue L is able to extract from the state, the more money can
be spent on manipulating the salience of issues in a way that redounds to the G party’s advantage, the
more money can be funneled towards the establishment of clientelistic links with voters, and so forth.
Thus, it is logical to suppose that ψ(Ω) is increasing in Ω. We assume that it takes the following linear
functional form: ψ(Ω) = σ + βΩ. Given this characterization, if Ω = 0, ψ(Ω) = σ. Therefore, the
variable σ ∈ [−1,1] indicates the electorate’s "natural" preference for G over O. That is, it represents
the electorate’s preference for G when L is unable to extract any resources from the state. The variable
β ∈ R
+
, in turn, indicates the marginal effect of such resources on party vote shares.
The variable τ represents the (inverse of) the diversity of preferences in the electorate. The greater
it is, the less votes depend on party activities and the more they depend on exogenous factors. Given
that
is a uniform random variable, τ is a uniform random variable as well, the latter having support
[−
τ
2η
,
τ
2η
]. The ratio
τ
η
is the length of this support. The greater this ratio, the more exogenous factors
will have the potential to create large shifts in voter preferences for or against the G party. This ratio
can be thought of as a measure of the degree of electoral volatility in the polity.
3.2.3
Proportional Representation and the Corruption Equilibrium
In order to decide whether or not to partake in L’s corruption scheme, a militant must generate an
expectation about his probability of attaining elected office given all the information at his disposal.
The fundamental inference regards the probability the he obtains a seat given his nomination to the
list of the G party. Here we will characterize the probability of obtaining a seat generically under
proportional representation without specifying the unique features of CLPR or OLPR. After having
conducted equilibrium analysis in the general case, we will characterize the equilibria which emerge in
the three scenarios mentioned earlier as well as the differences between them.
In the polity under consideration, all districts share a common district magnitude, denoted by k.
Moreover, following approximately Cox’s (1997) k + 1 rule, each party list runs exactly k candidates in
each district. Irrespective of whether a candidate runs in a CLPR system or in an OLPR system, he
18
Convention