systems more generally) as a hindrance to accountability and a facilitator of illicit financing, on the other
hand, can be found in past and present debates in countries such as Bolivia, Honduras and Venezuela.
The one constant in these debates is that reformers generally agree that their own electoral system is
the least attractive among the menu of potential options. Clearly, they cannot all be right.
What is going on here? What is the real relationship between electoral reform and political corrup-
tion and why is the policy debate so seemingly schizophrenic? This paper seeks to cut a way through
the fog. Specifically, the paper presents a novel account of the relationship between ballot structure
(i.e., the manner in which citizens cast their votes) and corruption related to the financing of politics. It
seeks to explain why the received academic wisdom tying candidate-centric electoral systems to political
corruption is as compelling as it is, but also shows how an incomplete picture of the causal pathways
linking ballot structure to corruption has led the predictions generated by this paradigm to miss their
mark.
The central argument is that the effects of a reform of list structure can be decomposed into two
components: a demand side component and a supply side component. In essence, the two components
represent countervailing effects of electoral reform.
On the one hand, a rich body of scholarship in comparative politics demonstrates that electoral
systems which encourage intraparty competition, of which OLPR is one variant, tend to produce costly
campaigns and generate high demand among politicians for electoral resources. This work establishes
a link between ballot structure, campaign expenses, and the willingness of politicians to accept illicit
monies to meet those expenses. In so doing, it demonstrates the existence of a demand side linkage
between ballot structure and political corruption.
On the other hand, this paper will demonstrate that there is another channel through which ballot
structure influences levels of political corruption. The channel consists of the linkage between ballot
structure and political career control, and the implications that such control holds for the behavior of
party militants in highly politicized bureaucracies. Electoral systems which magnify leadership control,
such as CLPR, give party leaders a means of leverage vis-à-vis politically oriented bureaucrats in the
public administration. With such leverage, it is easier to convince bureaucrats to engage in risky
behavior for the benefit of their party, thus facilitating political corruption. This is the supply side
linkage between ballot structure and political corruption. It considers the relationship between ballot
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Convention