Author's Keywords: China, central-local relations, fiscal transfer, need, political bargaining, efficiency, investment	Convention All Academic Convention makes running your annual conference simple and cost effective. It is your online solution for abstract management, peer review, and scheduling for your annual meeting or convention. Submission - Custom fields, multiple submission types, tracks, audio visual, multiple upload formats, automatic conversion to pdf. Review - Peer Review, Bulk reviewer assignment, bulk emails, ranking, z-score statistics, and multiple worksheets! Reports - Many standard and custom reports generated while you wait. Print programs with participant indexes, event grids, and more! Scheduling - Flexible and convenient grid scheduling within rooms and buildings. Conflict checking and advanced filtering. Communication - Bulk email tools to help your administrators send reminders and responses. Use form letters, a message center, and much more! Management - Search tools, duplicate people management, editing tools, submission transfers, many tools to manage a variety of conference management headaches! Click here for more information.
Association: Name: American Political Science Association URL: http://www.apsanet.org
Citation: URL: http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p151250_index.html Direct Link: HTML Code:

Zhan, J. Vivian. "Need, Bargaining, or Efficiency Driven? Explaining Central-Local Fiscal Transfers in Post-Reform China" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Marriott, Loews Philadelphia, and the Pennsylvania Convention Center, Philadelphia, PA, Aug 31, 2006 <Not Available>. 2011-03-13 <http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p151250_index.html>

Zhan, J. , 2006-08-31 "Need, Bargaining, or Efficiency Driven? Explaining Central-Local Fiscal Transfers in Post-Reform China" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Marriott, Loews Philadelphia, and the Pennsylvania Convention Center, Philadelphia, PA Online <APPLICATION/PDF>. 2011-03-13 from http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p151250_index.html

Publication Type: Proceeding Abstract: An examination of China’s central-provincial fiscal transfers in the post-reform era shows a pattern of wild cross-regional variations: some provinces submitted huge amounts of revenue to the center; while other provinces received considerable central subsidies. Why did some provinces enjoy more fiscal power than others? The need-based and bargaining-based theories have provided different hypotheses to explain such cross-regional variations. But in this paper I argue that both theories fall short of telling the whole story about central-local fiscal transfers in China. An alternative explanation is that the Chinese central government tended to make larger fiscal transfers to localities that used their revenues more efficiently and achieved higher economic development level. In this way, fiscal transfer essentially functioned as an investment: By transferring more fiscal revenues to localities where they could be efficiently used to yield high returns, the center could harvest more fiscal revenue in the future.

Fiscal Crisis, Political Crisis?-- Financing Local Government in China

Changes in China?s Local Governments: Adaptive Political and Socio-Cultural Response to Sweeping Economic Reforms