What political factors influence the allocation of economic patronage and support
in democracies? In other words, how do we understand which actors benefit from
government largess and which are left in the cold? Answering this question is vital to
improving our knowledge of how states and markets interact around the world. Many
governments intervene heavily in their national economies, making economic patronage
(including such instruments as trade protection, subsidies, government loans, and
industrial licenses) an important driver of outcomes. As scholars of the developmental
state have shown, governments can spur rapid growth through the (economically)
efficient application of support.
In most countries, however, the allocation of economic
benefits tends to follow a political rather than an economic logic.
Scholars have advanced a variety of explanations in their efforts to understand
who gets what. Some have suggested that government generosity depends simply on the
influence of the potential recipient. Researchers have proposed, for example, that more
geographically concentrated industries are more likely to receive trade protection.
Alternatively, some have suggested that industries dominated by a small number of firms
are more effective at soliciting the state than are highly decentralized industries.
Other
political scientists have highlighted the role played by domestic institutional variation in
aggregating and mediating the demands of aspiring government clients. There is, for
example, evidence that such factors as the structure of electoral systems and the
relationship between executives and legislatures influence the allocation of economic
Despite these important advances, the literature has largely overlooked one
institution that may profoundly influence the distribution of government benefits – the
political party. While prior studies have examined the impact of party ideology and party
3
Convention