system on various types of patronage distribution, party organization has mostly fallen by
In this article, I hope to help remedy that problem by examining
how changing party centralization drove important changes in the allocation of economic
My understanding of party centralization, the component of party organization
that I examine here, takes its cue from the literature on the organizational characteristics
of parties.
In systems with centralized parties, decision-making is primarily in the hands
of national party leaders. These leaders may head the party organization, hold key
positions in government, or both. Whatever the case, they exercise significant power
over the party apparatus and the party’s elected deputies. Often, the source of this power
is their control over the party name in legislative elections, but other means of leverage
are also possible.
When centralized parties hold the reigns of power, national party leaders will
make the decisions as to which groups receive economic patronage and at what level.
These national leaders will be in a position to assess how patronage can best be targeted
to achieve their party’s national political goals. As a result, they will distribute economic
benefits to particularly influential and strategic regions and firms. National party leaders
might, for example, target patronage to contested constituencies to firm up their local
support. Sub-national party officials will probably continue to advocate to the party
leadership for patronage in their constituencies, but only those from the more electorally
strategic locales will succeed. Likewise, potential clients in the private sector will
continue to lobby for state aid, but only the more organized and well financed are likely
to achieve their aims. In systems with centralized parties, therefore, economic patronage
will generally be concentrated in the most influential and strategic industries and regions.
4