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Association: Name: American Political Science Association URL: http://www.apsanet.org
Citation: URL: http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p151428_index.html Direct Link: HTML Code:

Efrat, Asif. "Tackling Traffic: International Cooperation against Illicit Trade" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Marriott, Loews Philadelphia, and the Pennsylvania Convention Center, Philadelphia, PA, Aug 31, 2006 <Not Available>. 2011-03-13 <http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p151428_index.html>

Efrat, A. , 2006-08-31 "Tackling Traffic: International Cooperation against Illicit Trade" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Marriott, Loews Philadelphia, and the Pennsylvania Convention Center, Philadelphia, PA Online <APPLICATION/PDF>. 2011-03-13 from http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p151428_index.html

Publication Type: Proceeding Abstract: The paper offers a theoretical framework for analyzing international efforts against illicit trade. I argue that the main obstacle to such efforts is the conflict of interest between pro-traffic and anti-traffic governments. Pro-traffic governments support domestic actors who benefit from the trade (e.g. arms and drugs manufacturers, banks laundering money) and oppose initiatives to ban or strictly regulate the trade; anti-traffic governments support such initiatives since they bear heavy social costs resulting from the trade (e.g. high rates of gun violence or drug addiction). Pro-traffic governments may ultimately join the cooperative endeavors due to interstate coercion or pressure from domestic public opinion and transnational civil society. However, due to the divergence of preferences between pro-traffic and anti-traffic governments, anti-traffic arrangements usually take the form of soft law. To support my argument, I examine the international efforts against trafficking in drugs, small arms, persons, cultural property, and money laundering.

Privatized Global Governance: Direct Participation of Industry and Interest Group in International Organizations

Drugs, Sex and Labor : Gender, Security and the International Political Economy of Illicit Trafficking

Bargaining, International Regimes and Newly Industrialized Countries: The Politics of Social Clauses in South Korean and Mexican Entry into the OECD and US-Based Free Trade Agreements