Theoretical Argument
The theory of cooperation I develop is an interest- and power- based theory, which emphasizes the
distributional effects of illicit trade. Domestic politics plays an important role in this theory as well.
I lay out my theoretical argument in three parts. The first introduces the actors and their preferences;
the second discusses the origins of cooperation against illicit trafficking, namely who cooperates
and why; and the third part of the argument concerns the legalization of anti-traffic cooperation.
Actors and Preferences
The first part of the analysis requires me to identify the main actors in illicit markets, their
preferences and strategies. The next step will be aggregation of the domestic interests to a
government preference.
As in any other market, illicit markets are constituted of producers and consumers. The
producers group includes diverse actors. First, producers represent various economic sectors and
industries: agriculture (narcotic drugs), services (banking, sex industry), and manufacturing
(pharmaceutical industries, arms producers). Second, while most producers are privately-owned,
some are government-owned (e.g. arms manufacturers in France, Egypt, and Israel). Third, while
some producers are legitimate actors whose activity is, for the most part, legal (e.g. banks, arms
manufacturers), other producers are “illegitimate” actors, as their activity in its entirety is illegal
(e.g. antiquities looters). Despite the significant differences between producers, I assume that they,
like any economic actor, are motivated by profit-maximization. They oppose a complete ban on the
trade or a very strict regulation that might put their profits at risk. By and large, producers are
oblivious to the negative effects that their products might have. Even when they know that their
products could be diverted to illegal and harmful uses (e.g. the use of small arms by rebel groups in
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Convention