cooperation established? I argue that once cooperation is initiated, governments that initially
supported the traffic are forced to reconsider their position, since they come under pressure from
three possible sources: 1. interstate coercion 2. domestic public opinion 3. transnational civil society.
The pro-traffic governments would be happier if the original, noncooperative status quo had never
been disrupted and if the traffic could continue unobstructed. They do not view anti-traffic
cooperation as promoting their interests. However, the cooperative arrangement established by anti-
traffic governments and the resulting pressures to join make it much more difficult to sustain the
non-cooperative position. Pro-traffic governments are left with what they view as a bad option
(cooperating against the traffic) and an even worse alternative (incurring the costs of non-
cooperation). Faced with two bad options, pro-traffic governments will opt for the lesser evil and
agree, reluctantly, to cooperate.
The clearest example for external coercion forcing a pro-traffic government to cooperate
concerns the German participation in the international drug regime. Germany was reluctant to join
the regime, since its pharmaceutical industry benefited from unrestricted sales of opium derivatives.
The victorious powers in World WAR I ultimately forced Germany to join the drug regime as a part
of the peace agreement. Another example is the Financial Action Task Force’s use of coercion
against countries which do not comply with the money-laundering regime. These countries find
themselves in a “black list” of non-cooperative jurisdictions and their financial transactions with
members of the regime may be restricted or even prohibited. An example of internal pressure is best
seen in the case of Britain and the drug regime. Domestic public opinion in Britain came to oppose
the opium trade and ultimately convinced the government to join the anti-drug campaign. Finally,
concerns about criticism and pressure from transnational civil society influenced the US decision to
cooperate with the campaign against the illicit small arms trade. These examples show us what
types of costs governments might incur if they refuse to cooperate with anti-traffic arrangements.
2
For an argument along these lines see Oatley and Nabors 1998; Gruber 2000.
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Convention