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Taking Guns to a Knife Fight: An Empirical Study of Effective Counterinsurgency
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involving only regular forces, 57% of the battle deaths were suffered by the rebels. Indigenous forces fared much worse than their active duty comrades; only 27% of the deaths reported as a result of clashes between indigenous and the rebels were from the enemy side meaning the large majority of these deaths – 73% - were inflicted on the government forces. However, in the 45 incidents where elite forces and indigenous units operated together, kiafrac takes a value of .84- a highly significant increase albeit a comparatively small sample of incidents.
Figure 9: Loss Exchange Fractions by Type of COIN Force
0
.2
.4
.6
.8
R
ebels K
illed/T
otal C
om
batant D
eaths
Killed in Action Fraction
ELITE
ELITE/INDIG
INDIG
REGULAR
Summary of Findings at the Operational Incident Level of Analysis The comparative tests conducted in this sample indicate the type of unit involved in an operation is strongly associated with conflict outcomes in terms of government, rebel, and friendly casualties. Consistent with my hypotheses, I argue internal differences rooted in quality and structures of the units themselves are driving the variation in performance and outcomes. Other possible causal explanations exist, however, that merit further testing given the level of detail provided by the data. Government Killed in Action Indigenous units’ suffer the greatest mean number of losses in operations followed by regular forces and elite units in that order. This is measured by the higher mean government killed per operation these forces are involved in. This ordering is consistent when controls for the type of enemy encountered and the major geographic region the combat took place in are introduced.
The explanation consistent with my theory and hypotheses attributes these empirical findings to a tactics, force protection and operational security story best explained by variation in small unit leadership, discipline and training. Limiting friendly casualties from operations demands high levels of vigilance at the small unit level especially under
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involving only regular forces, 57% of the battle deaths were suffered by the rebels.
Indigenous forces fared much worse than their active duty comrades; only 27% of the
deaths reported as a result of clashes between indigenous and the rebels were from the
enemy side meaning the large majority of these deaths – 73% - were inflicted on the
government forces. However, in the 45 incidents where elite forces and indigenous units
operated together, kiafrac takes a value of .84- a highly significant increase albeit a
comparatively small sample of incidents.
Figure 9: Loss Exchange Fractions by Type of COIN Force
0
.
2
.
4
.
6
.
8
R
e
b
e
l
s
K
i
l
l
e
d
/
T
o
t
a
l
C
o
m
b
a
t
a
n
t
D
e
a
t
h
s
Killed in Action Fraction
ELITE
ELITE/INDIG
INDIG
REGULAR
Summary of Findings at the Operational Incident Level of Analysis
The comparative tests conducted in this sample indicate the type of unit involved in
an operation is strongly associated with conflict outcomes in terms of government, rebel,
and friendly casualties. Consistent with my hypotheses, I argue internal differences
rooted in quality and structures of the units themselves are driving the variation in
performance and outcomes. Other possible causal explanations exist, however, that merit
further testing given the level of detail provided by the data.
Government Killed in Action Indigenous units’ suffer the greatest mean number of losses
in operations followed by regular forces and elite units in that order. This is measured by
the higher mean government killed per operation these forces are involved in. This
ordering is consistent when controls for the type of enemy encountered and the major
geographic region the combat took place in are introduced.
The explanation consistent with my theory and hypotheses attributes these empirical
findings to a tactics, force protection and operational security story best explained by
variation in small unit leadership, discipline and training. Limiting friendly casualties
from operations demands high levels of vigilance at the small unit level especially under
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