All Academic, Inc. Research Logo

Info/CitationFAQResearchAll Academic Inc.
Document

Taking Guns to a Knife Fight: An Empirical Study of Effective Counterinsurgency
Unformatted Document Text:  the risks associated with each. Succinctly, security forces must capture and kill the rebel “mosquitoes” concurrent with supporting efforts to drain the swamps that incubate them. A number of challenges and tensions must be balanced in order for the military to perform these complementary tasks and require the COIN force to accomplish the following: 1. Leverage advantages gained by dispersing small units among the population while avoiding placing them at unacceptable risk of annihilation by the rebels. The insurgent influence and bases of support are often far from areas of consolidated government control. Denying sanctuary, freedom of movement and sources of support may require government presence. A broad blanket of security provided by troops familiar with their locale who can respond to emerging threats rapidly and discriminately is certainly a desirable capability for effective COIN. These advantages must be balanced against force protection vulnerabilities and a reduced ability to mass on rebel targets. (Paget) 2. Establish the rapport needed to increase access to local information without becoming co-opted or embroiled in local fights. In order for COIN forces to find rebel sanctuaries and efficiently commit resources to restrict their movement and reduce popular support for the insurgency, they must develop the rapport and relationships with the local populace needed to illicit accurate information about the disposition and identity of the rebels. The COIN troops most able to do this are those recruited from among these same groups of potential informants and denouncers. However, these troops do not “check their personal baggage” at the compound gate when they are recruited into the COIN force and issued a firearm. Insuring these local forces fight the government’s fight and not personal or family feuds is a challenge requiring disciplined leadership and supervision. 3. Maintain and employ forces capable of striking targets of opportunity decisively without inflicting collateral damage. When the concerted efforts of the COIN force- and perhaps good fortune – combine to successfully separate the rebel from the population, a fleeting opportunity exists to bring the superior resources of the state to bear on these targets. The COIN force must seize such opportunities decisively with violence of action and shock effect when necessary. However, applying firepower with the precision needed to avoid non-combatant casualties is especially challenging for the COIN force and even a few failures to enforce this discrimination can have severely debilitating effects on the legitimacy of government COIN efforts. 4. Enforce centralized intent and monitoring without inhibiting decentralized execution and responsiveness to unique local conditions. Combating insurgents demands agile forces able to create and exploit opportunities at local levels all the while insuring their actions support the broad objectives of the State. The flexibility needed to take advantage of tactical and operational successes must be fostered at local levels and not restricted by government overall COIN plans. Effective COIN requires decentralized execution of dynamic operational strategies guided - but not constrained- by centralized government intent. 4

Authors: Felter, Joe.
first   previous   Page 4 of 54   next   last



background image
the risks associated with each. Succinctly, security forces must capture and kill the rebel
“mosquitoes” concurrent with supporting efforts to drain the swamps that incubate them.
A number of challenges and tensions must be balanced in order for the military to
perform these complementary tasks and require the COIN force to accomplish the
following:
1. Leverage advantages gained by dispersing small units among the population while
avoiding placing them at unacceptable risk of annihilation by the rebels.
The insurgent
influence and bases of support are often far from areas of consolidated government
control. Denying sanctuary, freedom of movement and sources of support may require
government presence. A broad blanket of security provided by troops familiar with their
locale who can respond to emerging threats rapidly and discriminately is certainly a
desirable capability for effective COIN. These advantages must be balanced against force
protection vulnerabilities and a reduced ability to mass on rebel targets. (Paget)

2. Establish the rapport needed to increase access to local information without
becoming co-opted or embroiled in local fights.
In order for COIN forces to find rebel
sanctuaries and efficiently commit resources to restrict their movement and reduce
popular support for the insurgency, they must develop the rapport and relationships with
the local populace needed to illicit accurate information about the disposition and identity
of the rebels. The COIN troops most able to do this are those recruited from among these
same groups of potential informants and denouncers. However, these troops do not
“check their personal baggage” at the compound gate when they are recruited into the
COIN force and issued a firearm. Insuring these local forces fight the government’s fight
and not personal or family feuds is a challenge requiring disciplined leadership and
supervision.
3. Maintain and employ forces capable of striking targets of opportunity decisively
without inflicting collateral damage.
When the concerted efforts of the COIN force- and
perhaps good fortune – combine to successfully separate the rebel from the population, a
fleeting opportunity exists to bring the superior resources of the state to bear on these
targets. The COIN force must seize such opportunities decisively with violence of action
and shock effect when necessary. However, applying firepower with the precision
needed to avoid non-combatant casualties is especially challenging for the COIN force
and even a few failures to enforce this discrimination can have severely debilitating
effects on the legitimacy of government COIN efforts.
4. Enforce centralized intent and monitoring without inhibiting decentralized execution
and responsiveness to unique local conditions.
Combating insurgents demands agile
forces able to create and exploit opportunities at local levels all the while insuring their
actions support the broad objectives of the State.
The flexibility needed to take advantage of tactical and operational successes must be
fostered at local levels and not restricted by government overall COIN plans. Effective
COIN requires decentralized execution of dynamic operational strategies guided - but not
constrained- by centralized government intent.
4


Convention
Need a solution for abstract management? All Academic can help! Contact us today to find out how our system can help your annual meeting.
Submission - Custom fields, multiple submission types, tracks, audio visual, multiple upload formats, automatic conversion to pdf.
Review - Peer Review, Bulk reviewer assignment, bulk emails, ranking, z-score statistics, and multiple worksheets!
Reports - Many standard and custom reports generated while you wait. Print programs with participant indexes, event grids, and more!
Scheduling - Flexible and convenient grid scheduling within rooms and buildings. Conflict checking and advanced filtering.
Communication - Bulk email tools to help your administrators send reminders and responses. Use form letters, a message center, and much more!
Management - Search tools, duplicate people management, editing tools, submission transfers, many tools to manage a variety of conference management headaches!
Click here for more information.

first   previous   Page 4 of 54   next   last

©2008 All Academic, Inc.