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Taking Guns to a Knife Fight: An Empirical Study of Effective Counterinsurgency
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5. Conduct operations that credibly signal government control and ultimate victory and avoid revealing weaknesses and vulnerabilities that suggest eventual defeat. COIN operations must demonstrate government capacity and commitment to enforcing order and the legitimate authority of the government. Poorly led, inadequately trained, sub-optimally employed COIN troops can erode the credibility and attractiveness of the central government.
Optimal Qualities and Structures of COIN Forces The requirements placed on security forces combating insurgent threats are intimidating. The range of missions needed to prosecute effective COIN challenge the capacity of even the most advanced militaries. Prescriptions for optimal COIN strategies are difficult to make given the dynamic nature of rebel threats. A more useful approach, I believe, is to identify unit level characteristics of COIN forces that consistently predict success in COIN within and across diverse cases of insurgency. What are these unit level attributes of COIN forces and how do they affect the outcomes of government efforts to combat insurgency? Rather than simply list a set of universally desirable traits for COIN forces I divide these characteristics along two dimensions broadly defined by operational initiative and access to local information. I will argue that security forces that gain and maintain the initiative relative to their rebel opponents are most effective at providing military support to COIN. When this initiative is empowered by access to the terrain and population in the local area we see the most discriminate and thus effective military support.
Operational Initiative Seizing and maintaining the initiative is critical to the success of internal security operations. Superior relative initiative demonstrates the capacity and willingness of a military unit to dictate terms and act- not react- to the rebels and can credibly signal government control and commitment to the population, especially to those at the margins of support for the insurgents.
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Scholars and practitioners of counterinsurgency routinely single initiative out as a significant requirement for successful counterinsurgency both for the physical impact active aggressive operations can have on rebel livelihood and infrastructure as well as for the psychological impact superior initiative has on government troops, rebels and civilians. Aggressive small unit patrolling and frequent contact with the local population signals and credibly enforces control at local levels. This translates into greater sense of security and belief in the ultimate victory of the government all of which increases local support and collaboration with the government.
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The mix of activities initiated by the effective counterinsurgent force will reflect unique local conditions and threats which can vary across villages and over time. For example, in some cases superior initiative will include increased civil military operations and support to development projects while other situations will demand greater emphasis on offensive combat operations. Striking the balance and adapting to changed conditions is the essence of effective counterinsurgency.
Initiative’s Enabling Factors
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5. Conduct operations that credibly signal government control and ultimate victory and avoid revealing weaknesses and vulnerabilities that suggest eventual defeat. COIN operations must demonstrate government capacity and commitment to enforcing order and the legitimate authority of the government. Poorly led, inadequately trained, sub- optimally employed COIN troops can erode the credibility and attractiveness of the central government.
Optimal Qualities and Structures of COIN Forces The requirements placed on security forces combating insurgent threats are intimidating. The range of missions needed to prosecute effective COIN challenge the capacity of even the most advanced militaries. Prescriptions for optimal COIN strategies are difficult to make given the dynamic nature of rebel threats. A more useful approach, I believe, is to identify unit level characteristics of COIN forces that consistently predict success in COIN within and across diverse cases of insurgency. What are these unit level attributes of COIN forces and how do they affect the outcomes of government efforts to combat insurgency? Rather than simply list a set of universally desirable traits for COIN forces I divide these characteristics along two dimensions broadly defined by operational initiative and access to local information. I will argue that security forces that gain and maintain the initiative relative to their rebel opponents are most effective at providing military support to COIN. When this initiative is empowered by access to the terrain and population in the local area we see the most discriminate and thus effective military support.
Operational Initiative Seizing and maintaining the initiative is critical to the success of internal security operations. Superior relative initiative demonstrates the capacity and willingness of a military unit to dictate terms and act- not react- to the rebels and can credibly signal government control and commitment to the population, especially to those at the margins of support for the insurgents.
Scholars and practitioners of counterinsurgency routinely single initiative out as a significant requirement for successful counterinsurgency both for the physical impact active aggressive operations can have on rebel livelihood and infrastructure as well as for the psychological impact superior initiative has on government troops, rebels and civilians. Aggressive small unit patrolling and frequent contact with the local population signals and credibly enforces control at local levels. This translates into greater sense of security and belief in the ultimate victory of the government all of which increases local support and collaboration with the government.
The mix of activities initiated by the effective counterinsurgent force will reflect unique local conditions and threats which can vary across villages and over time. For example, in some cases superior initiative will include increased civil military operations and support to development projects while other situations will demand greater emphasis on offensive combat operations. Striking the balance and adapting to changed conditions is the essence of effective counterinsurgency.
Initiative’s Enabling Factors
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