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Taking Guns to a Knife Fight: An Empirical Study of Effective Counterinsurgency
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High
Local Information
Low
Quadrant I: Effective COIN Potential: High Initiative/High Local Information
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Military forces that possess leadership, training, and autonomy at the small unit level are more likely to take advantage of emerging opportunities and proactively conduct operations or, in other words, display high levels of initiative. When a unit with high initiative is complemented with access to in depth knowledge of the community they operate in, government forces have the greatest opportunity to conduct effective counterinsurgency.
Such units are able to interdict threats discriminately and initiate
operations proactively especially when their access to local information provides them with the predictive intelligence that only a developed human intelligence network can provide.
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Quadrant II: Wasted Opportunities: High Local Information/Low Initiative In cases where military forces have access to local information yet are unable – or unwilling- to exercise the initiative needed to capitalize on it, they miss the opportunity to conduct effective counterinsurgency. For example, locally recruited soldiers with knowledge of the physical and human terrain they are deployed in will not be able to leverage the critical information they might provide to operational planning if their leadership is not interested or unprepared, to initiate operations in support of counterinsurgency. At best they can provide information and intelligence to other operating units that may solicit it from them although this increases the “sensor to shooter gap” considerably and the increased response time limits the chances of this information translating into more successful operations. A worse outcome occurs when local forces, known to possess information regarding the threats in an area, are targeted more aggressively by rebels because of it.
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Another bad outcome occurs in cases where low
initiative proxies for poor leadership and supervision which makes it more likely that the lethal combination of government issued firearms and personal feuds and vendettas will combine with violent results.
Quadrant III: Behind the Wire: Low Initiative/Low Local Knowledge
When security forces display no initiative and have limited access to knowledge
of the threats and opportunities present in the communities they are employed in, little can be expected of them in terms of counterinsurgency. These forces will at best spend
II
Lost Opportunities
I
Effective Contribution to COIN
III
“Behind the Wire”
(Garrison/FOB Mentality)
IV
“Shooting in the Dark”
(Kicking Down Doors to Find
Out what is Behind Them)
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High
Local
Information
Low
Quadrant I: Effective COIN Potential: High Initiative/High Local Information
Military forces that possess leadership, training, and autonomy at the small unit level
are more likely to take advantage of emerging opportunities and proactively conduct
operations or, in other words, display high levels of initiative. When a unit with high
initiative is complemented with access to in depth knowledge of the community they
operate in, government forces have the greatest opportunity to conduct effective
counterinsurgency.
Such units are able to interdict threats discriminately and initiate
operations proactively especially when their access to local information provides them
with the predictive intelligence that only a developed human intelligence network can
provide.
Quadrant II: Wasted Opportunities: High Local Information/Low Initiative
In cases where military forces have access to local information yet are unable – or
unwilling- to exercise the initiative needed to capitalize on it, they miss the opportunity to
conduct effective counterinsurgency. For example, locally recruited soldiers with
knowledge of the physical and human terrain they are deployed in will not be able to
leverage the critical information they might provide to operational planning if their
leadership is not interested or unprepared, to initiate operations in support of
counterinsurgency. At best they can provide information and intelligence to other
operating units that may solicit it from them although this increases the “sensor to shooter
gap” considerably and the increased response time limits the chances of this information
translating into more successful operations. A worse outcome occurs when local forces,
known to possess information regarding the threats in an area, are targeted more
aggressively by rebels because of it.
Another bad outcome occurs in cases where low
initiative proxies for poor leadership and supervision which makes it more likely that the
lethal combination of government issued firearms and personal feuds and vendettas will
combine with violent results.
Quadrant III: Behind the Wire: Low Initiative/Low Local Knowledge
When security forces display no initiative and have limited access to knowledge
of the threats and opportunities present in the communities they are employed in, little
can be expected of them in terms of counterinsurgency. These forces will at best spend
II
Lost Opportunities
I
Effective Contribution to COIN
III
“Behind the Wire”
(Garrison/FOB Mentality)
IV
“Shooting in the Dark”
(Kicking Down Doors to Find
Out what is Behind Them)
9
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