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Wedge Strategies in Balance of Power Politics: Concepts, Controversies, and the Curious Case of Spain, 1940-41
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“It is never rational to concede the unity of the enemy camp.”
-George Modelski, 1962
Introduction
With strategic ties between Iran and Syria growing fast, the recent war between
Hezbollah and Israel spotlighted the need for a policy to pry Syria away from Iran.
1
The
2003 Iraq war, was brought on by Baghdad’s successful dismantling of the coalition that had formed to disarm it in 1991.
2
Now, after erecting a new Iraqi government dominated by
Shiites, the U.S. must work to divide governments in Baghdad and Tehran which may be drawn together by religious affinity and common enmity toward Sunni Arab states. And in
the global war on terror, of course, the U.S. and its partners need to employ “disaggregation” strategies “that aggravate the divisions among jihadists rather than giving them common
cause.”
3
Meanwhile, Pyongyang frustrates American efforts to impose nuclear disarmament
through concert diplomacy, by sowing and exploiting divisions within it. This trouble with
holding together a nonproliferation coalition against North Korea has parallels in the U.S.-European approach to Iran’s nuclear programs. As long as nonproliferation remains a major
goal of U.S. security policy, defending such coalitions against wedge strategies will be a major challenge.
4
Finally, of course, there is China, which is certain to devote much energy and
thought to dividing the U.S. from its allies in Asia.
5
Today, as in the past, the political
conditions for peace and war are often shaped by the fate of wedge strategies.
Sometimes, we come to appreciate their importance by pondering the costs and
consequences of decisions not employ them. A century ago, Germany likely committed a
catastrophic blunder when it downgraded a tie to Russia (the Reinsurance Treaty) that kept
1
Michael Slackman, “Wary of U.S., Syria and Iran Strengthen Ties,” New York Times, June 25, 2006; Helene
Cooper and David E. Sanger, “U.S. Plan Seeks to Wedge Syria Away from Iran,” New York Times, July 23, 2006; Andrew Tabler, “To Help Israel, Help Syria,” New York Times, August 5, 2006.
2
Charles Duelfer, “How Baghdad Divided the Conquerors,” Los Angeles Times, June 11, 2000. During the
1991 Gulf War, Baghdad also tried to divide the US-led UN coalition. See Daniel Byman and Matthew
Waxman, “Defeating U.S. Coercion,” Survival, Vol. 41, No. 2 (Summer 1999), pp. 107-20.
3
David J. Kilcullen, “Countering Global Insurgency,” Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 28, No. 4 (August
2005), pp. 608-611; Jonathan Stevenson, “Demilitarizing the ‘War on Terror,” Survival, Vol. 38, No. 2 (summer 2006), p. 47.
4
See Stephen Walt, “Containing Rogues and Renegades: Coalition Strategies and Counterproliferation,” in
Victor Utgoff, ed., The Next Nuclear Crisis (MIT Press, 1999); and Brad Roberts and Victor Utgoff,
“Coalitions Against NBC-Armed Regional Aggressors: How Are They Formed, Maintained, and Led?” Comparative Strategy, Vol. 16, No. 3 (1997), pp. 233-252.
5
Robert Kaplan, “How We Would Fight China,” The Atlantic, June 2005, 49-64; Joshua Kurlantzick, “Cultural
Revolution: How China’s New Diplomacy is changing the World,” New Republic, June 27, 2005; Thomas
Christensen, “Posing Problems without Catching Up: China’s Rise and Challenges for U.S. Security Policy,” International Security, Vol. 25, No. 4 (Spring 2001), p. 11.
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| | Authors: Crawford, Timothy. |
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2
“It is never rational to concede the unity of the enemy camp.”
-George Modelski, 1962
Introduction
With strategic ties between Iran and Syria growing fast, the recent war between
Hezbollah and Israel spotlighted the need for a policy to pry Syria away from Iran.
The
2003 Iraq war, was brought on by Baghdad’s successful dismantling of the coalition that had
formed to disarm it in 1991.
Now, after erecting a new Iraqi government dominated by
Shiites, the U.S. must work to divide governments in Baghdad and Tehran which may be
drawn together by religious affinity and common enmity toward Sunni Arab states. And in
the global war on terror, of course, the U.S. and its partners need to employ “disaggregation”
strategies “that aggravate the divisions among jihadists rather than giving them common
cause.”
Meanwhile, Pyongyang frustrates American efforts to impose nuclear disarmament
through concert diplomacy, by sowing and exploiting divisions within it. This trouble with
holding together a nonproliferation coalition against North Korea has parallels in the U.S.-
European approach to Iran’s nuclear programs. As long as nonproliferation remains a major
goal of U.S. security policy, defending such coalitions against wedge strategies will be a major
challenge.
Finally, of course, there is China, which is certain to devote much energy and
thought to dividing the U.S. from its allies in Asia.
Today, as in the past, the political
conditions for peace and war are often shaped by the fate of wedge strategies.
Sometimes, we come to appreciate their importance by pondering the costs and
consequences of decisions not employ them. A century ago, Germany likely committed a
catastrophic blunder when it downgraded a tie to Russia (the Reinsurance Treaty) that kept
1
Michael Slackman, “Wary of U.S., Syria and Iran Strengthen Ties,” New York Times, June 25, 2006; Helene
Cooper and David E. Sanger, “U.S. Plan Seeks to Wedge Syria Away from Iran,” New York Times, July 23,
2006; Andrew Tabler, “To Help Israel, Help Syria,” New York Times, August 5, 2006.
2
Charles Duelfer, “How Baghdad Divided the Conquerors,” Los Angeles Times, June 11, 2000. During the
1991 Gulf War, Baghdad also tried to divide the US-led UN coalition. See Daniel Byman and Matthew
Waxman, “Defeating U.S. Coercion,” Survival, Vol. 41, No. 2 (Summer 1999), pp. 107-20.
3
David J. Kilcullen, “Countering Global Insurgency,” Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 28, No. 4 (August
2005), pp. 608-611; Jonathan Stevenson, “Demilitarizing the ‘War on Terror,” Survival, Vol. 38, No. 2 (summer
2006), p. 47.
4
See Stephen Walt, “Containing Rogues and Renegades: Coalition Strategies and Counterproliferation,” in
Victor Utgoff, ed., The Next Nuclear Crisis (MIT Press, 1999); and Brad Roberts and Victor Utgoff,
“Coalitions Against NBC-Armed Regional Aggressors: How Are They Formed, Maintained, and Led?”
Comparative Strategy, Vol. 16, No. 3 (1997), pp. 233-252.
5
Robert Kaplan, “How We Would Fight China,” The Atlantic, June 2005, 49-64; Joshua Kurlantzick, “Cultural
Revolution: How China’s New Diplomacy is changing the World,” New Republic, June 27, 2005; Thomas
Christensen, “Posing Problems without Catching Up: China’s Rise and Challenges for U.S. Security Policy,”
International Security, Vol. 25, No. 4 (Spring 2001), p. 11.
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