5
balancing behavior as any effort by a state to increase its relative power over a perceived threat.
From
the balancing state’s perspective, it is always about improving relative power, and there are
many ways to do it. If State A has five chips, and Threat B has ten, A can balance against B
either by adding one chip to its own stack, or subtracting one chip from B’s. If A can do
both at the same time by taking one from B’s stack it is a real coup. But that is not necessary
to improve its position, for just by taking B down to nine—neutralizing one of B’s chips if
you will—A can increase the relative strength of its five.
The balancing behavior defined here is statecraft—consciously directed foreign
policy—not patterns of “automatic balancing” at the system level. The emphasis on agency
and choice is crucial because we know that states sometimes miss opportunities to divide
their adversaries, with grave consequences for their relative power.
This definition also
means that it is irrelevant whether the balancer is initially weaker or stronger than the threat.
There is no reason to assume that the weak cannot threaten the strong and provoke a
balancing response.
All that matters is that the balancer seeks to improve its strength
relative to the threat. Although at the system level it is necessary to posit that balancing tends
“automatically” toward reducing or matching preponderant or rising power, this does not
imply a necessary characteristic of deliberate balancing by individual states.
Thus, wedge
strategies conceived as a deliberate balancing may include efforts by the strong to increase
their relative power over the weak, and vice versa. Finally, this definition means that the
“threat” need not comprise one state. It can be an actual or potential combination of
threatening states as well. This may seem obvious, but as we shall see, it is often elided in
literature on balancing. In sum, given our definition of balancing, wedge strategies are a form of
statecraft, a policy to increase a state’s relative power over external threats, by preventing the grouping or
causing the dispersal of threatening alliances.
disposal, in an attempt to offset or diminish the advantages enjoyed by that other state or coalition.”
“Correspondence: Striking the Balance,” International Security, Vol. 30, No. 3 (Winter 2005/06), pp. 184-84.
13
For a similar definition, see Susan B. Martin, “From Balance of Power to Balancing Behavior: The Long and
Winding Road,” ed. Andrew K. Hanami, Perspectives on Structural Realism (Palgrave-Macmillan, 2003),” p. 70
14
Timothy W. Crawford, “Missed Chances and Bad Bets: Wedge Strategy Failures in Balance of Power
Politics,” working paper.
15
As Walt has noted, “states may balance by allying with other strong states, if a weaker power is more
dangerous for other reasons.” Stephen M. Walt, “Alliance Formation and the Balance of Power,” International
Security, Vol. 9, No. 4 (Spring 1985), p. 9.
16
On this point see Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics, pp., 119-123; Snyder, Alliance Politics, p.
157; Jervis, System Effects (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1997), pp. 131-135; and Art,
“Correspondence,” p. 184.
Convention