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Association: Name: American Political Science Association URL: http://www.apsanet.org
Citation: URL: http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p151584_index.html Direct Link: HTML Code:

Schofield, Julian. "Targeted Proliferation in Multipolarity" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Marriott, Loews Philadelphia, and the Pennsylvania Convention Center, Philadelphia, PA, Aug 31, 2006 <Not Available>. 2011-03-13 <http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p151584_index.html>

Schofield, J. , 2006-08-31 "Targeted Proliferation in Multipolarity" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Marriott, Loews Philadelphia, and the Pennsylvania Convention Center, Philadelphia, PA Online <PDF>. 2011-03-13 from http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p151584_index.html

Publication Type: Proceeding Abstract: The normative wisdom is that states should not share nuclear weapons technology, and consequently do so rarely. In the 1968/1995 Non-Proliferation Treaty, nuclear weapon states promise not to assist non-nuclear weapon states to obtain nuclear weapons, who in turn promise not to receive nuclear weapons. The text of the NPT gives the impression that there is little trade in nuclear weapons, both normatively and actually. However, nuclear weapons have been shared and our goal is to explain the conditions under which they are shared. Those that argue that deterrence is easy to achieve explain nuclear sharing as a function of whether a state seeks to have a target state possessing effective deterrence or not, and this usually depends on the state�s interest in preserving the systemic status quo. Those that argue that nuclear deterrence is difficult to achieve see nuclear weapons as akin to conventional weapons, and therefore see few incentives in sharing such powerful technology. We argue that nuclear sharing, because nuclear weapons are so exceptionally powerful instruments, is never conducted with allies, and only with geographically distant and dependent proxies opposing a powerful and common adversary. In effect, a theory incorporating the underlying logic of the balance of power environment does a superior job of explaining when states share nuclear assets than any theory grounded in the special qualities of nuclear weapons themselves. In all six of our cases of nuclear sharing, the principal incentive to transfer nuclear resources was the setting-up of a nuclear proxy to distract the attention of another power.

U.S. Policy to Asia for Regional Powers in New Science and Technology: China, Russia, Japan and Korea with Nuclear Potential

The Politics of Nuclear Cooperation: Why States Share Nuclear Weapons Technology