Julian Schofield and Micah Zenko
determined by its relationship to the overall system. States that benefit from the
maintenance of the status quo in the international system are therefore likely to
support the sharing of nuclear technology with any and all other states.
seek to over-turn the international order through war are therefore less likely to
share nuclear weapons technology with potential adversaries. Status quo states that
require war to maintain their eroding position in the international system are
unlikely to share nuclear weapons technology with non-nuclear states that are the
engine, the beneficiaries or the fruits of this deterioration.
In the elusive deterrence sharing model, nuclear weapons provide fungible and
scalable power similar to conventional weapons, and nuclear deterrence may fail. Not all
nuclear arsenals, even mature ones, deliver equivalently robust deterrence. Secure
second-strike capabilities are expensive, and therefore the preserve of great powers.
the other end of the spectrum are small nuclear forces capable of far more limited
dissuasion. States that share this perspective do not recognize any logical limit to the
number of nuclear weapons that are required.
In part this is because military targets
will predominate and are nearly unlimited in number.
It may also be because it is
unclear whether nuclear weapons favor the offense or the defense.
acceptance of the elusive deterrence model can be found in the U.S.’s 1993-1994 Nuclear
posture Review which reaffirmed the retaliatory use of conventionalized nuclear weapons
against chemical attacks.
Even if a state is going to develop its own nuclear weapons
eventually, it is not worthwhile to speed up that process because it will reduce a state’s
relative power. Also, states do not provide weapons believing that if they do not they will
have alienated the recipient, since by definition the state will not have been a good ally.
States will therefore be reluctant to share nuclear technology and weapons for fear
of a relative loss of their power and of the creation of independent poles of power,
and will therefore only share with close allies.
States will share nuclear technology
if the target state will reciprocate with commensurate resources, usually in the form of
nuclear fuel or technology. States will therefore barter nuclear technology if the
outcome leads them to be better off in terms of relative power in the system.
Deterrence can fail.
According to Scott Sagan, certain regimes are more likely
to go to war, which reduces confidence that a given state armed with nuclear weapons
will behave with restraint.
Nuclear pessimists predict that states will not share nuclear
weapons with states whose internal instability precludes effective deterrence.
factors may also play a role in affirming the mundane nature of nuclear weapons.
From this we can predict that states will not provide weapons to states without
stable domestic regimes and which do not appear viable.
Nuclear Sharing with Proxies
We propose a realist balance of power model to predict when states will gift
nuclear weapons. As TV Paul has emphasized, nuclear weapons are instruments that can
have subtle political effects within the international system, and it is therefore appropriate
to consider its effects on broader balancing phenomena.
Balance of power dynamics
are characterized by the role of third-parties states, which can intervene and complicate
the calculations of policymakers. Third parties may provide help or resistance. Third
parties are principally associated with deterring conflict by making attackers uncertain
whether they are vulnerable on a second front if they commit themselves to war (the
3
Convention