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Jordan and the Gulf Wars: Determining Hashemite Foreign Policy in 1990-91 and 2003
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section, I analyze three factors which played a prominent role in shaping Jordanian foreign policy: public opinion and the liberalization necessary for it to constrain government decisions, the imperatives of trade and aid, and the roles played by Kings Hussein and Abdallah. The fourth section examines three alternative theories and their limitations in predicting Jordanian foreign policy in the two Gulf wars. The fifth section concludes. Setting Up the Puzzle: Hashemite Foreign Policy in the Gulf Wars
Before moving on to an examination of the factors behind Amman’s actions during the
two crises, we will begin with an overview of Jordan’s relations with Iraq. Early in their modern histories, Jordan and Iraq were natural allies, ruled from 1921 to 1958 by brothers descended from the same Hashemite monarchy. The overthrow of the Iraqi monarchy in July 1958, followed by a series of military coups, led to an uneasy period in Jordanian-Iraqi relations. The lowest points in the relationship between the two states came during the 1970s. In September 1970, for example, Baghdad engaged in pro-Palestinian rhetoric during the civil war between the Jordanian army and the forces of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), but ultimately decided not to intervene militarily on the side of the Palestinians (Baram 1991, 51-53).
Previously ideological enemies, the Jordanian monarchy and the Ba’athist regime in Iraq
achieved a turnaround in their relationship with the 1978 Baghdad Arab Summit conference. With Egypt under President Anwar Sadat pursuing a separate peace with Israel, and American pressure on King Hussein to follow suit, the aim of the Baghdad Summit was to devise an alternative, unified Arab path which would maintain steadfastness against accommodation with Israel. Alone, King Hussein feared that Jordan would have no choice but to bow to American pressure. At the 1978 Summit, the King discovered in Iraq a willing ally, and one able to provide Jordan with strategic depth and economic support (Hamarneh 1992, 230-231). In the following year, the Iranian Revolution provided another reason for Jordan an Iraq to solidify their nascent alliance. The Islamist government in Tehran made no secret of its distaste for monarchies, and its desire to topple them and replace them with fundamentalist rulers like its own. Fearing the export of revolution to Jordanian soil, Amman sided with Iraq in the Iran-Iraq war, which began in September 1980 with the Iraqi invasion of Iran (Gause 1999). During the war, King Hussein went so far as to become Iraq’s chief ally and spokesman within the Arab world (Baram 1991, 56-57).
Shortly after the belligerents to the Iran-Iraq war submitted to a cease-fire, King Hussein
worked to cement his country’s close ties with Iraq during peacetime. The Arab Cooperation Council (ACC) provided a vehicle for this relationship, combining Jordan, Iraq, Egypt, and North Yemen into a formal alliance in February 1989. In addition to building upon economic relations with Iraq, the ACC served to reintegrate Egypt, which had been ostracized from the Arab League since its separate peace with Israel in the 1979 Camp David Accords, into the Arab fold (Robins 2004, 176-177).
As a formal ally of Iraq, with close relations with the Gulf states, the Jordanian regime
was concerned over the growing dispute between Iraq and Kuwait which emerged after the close of the Iran-Iraq war. Baghdad had several reasons for dispute with its smaller neighbor to the Southeast. The longest standing disagreement pertained to the legitimacy of the 1923 border
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section, I analyze three factors which played a prominent role in shaping Jordanian foreign
policy: public opinion and the liberalization necessary for it to constrain government decisions,
the imperatives of trade and aid, and the roles played by Kings Hussein and Abdallah. The
fourth section examines three alternative theories and their limitations in predicting Jordanian
foreign policy in the two Gulf wars. The fifth section concludes.
Setting Up the Puzzle: Hashemite Foreign Policy in the Gulf Wars
Before moving on to an examination of the factors behind Amman’s actions during the
two crises, we will begin with an overview of Jordan’s relations with Iraq. Early in their modern
histories, Jordan and Iraq were natural allies, ruled from 1921 to 1958 by brothers descended
from the same Hashemite monarchy. The overthrow of the Iraqi monarchy in July 1958,
followed by a series of military coups, led to an uneasy period in Jordanian-Iraqi relations. The
lowest points in the relationship between the two states came during the 1970s. In September
1970, for example, Baghdad engaged in pro-Palestinian rhetoric during the civil war between the
Jordanian army and the forces of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), but ultimately
decided not to intervene militarily on the side of the Palestinians (Baram 1991, 51-53).
Previously ideological enemies, the Jordanian monarchy and the Ba’athist regime in Iraq
achieved a turnaround in their relationship with the 1978 Baghdad Arab Summit conference.
With Egypt under President Anwar Sadat pursuing a separate peace with Israel, and American
pressure on King Hussein to follow suit, the aim of the Baghdad Summit was to devise an
alternative, unified Arab path which would maintain steadfastness against accommodation with
Israel. Alone, King Hussein feared that Jordan would have no choice but to bow to American
pressure. At the 1978 Summit, the King discovered in Iraq a willing ally, and one able to
provide Jordan with strategic depth and economic support (Hamarneh 1992, 230-231). In the
following year, the Iranian Revolution provided another reason for Jordan an Iraq to solidify
their nascent alliance. The Islamist government in Tehran made no secret of its distaste for
monarchies, and its desire to topple them and replace them with fundamentalist rulers like its
own. Fearing the export of revolution to Jordanian soil, Amman sided with Iraq in the Iran-Iraq
war, which began in September 1980 with the Iraqi invasion of Iran (Gause 1999). During the
war, King Hussein went so far as to become Iraq’s chief ally and spokesman within the Arab
world (Baram 1991, 56-57).
Shortly after the belligerents to the Iran-Iraq war submitted to a cease-fire, King Hussein
worked to cement his country’s close ties with Iraq during peacetime. The Arab Cooperation
Council (ACC) provided a vehicle for this relationship, combining Jordan, Iraq, Egypt, and
North Yemen into a formal alliance in February 1989. In addition to building upon economic
relations with Iraq, the ACC served to reintegrate Egypt, which had been ostracized from the
Arab League since its separate peace with Israel in the 1979 Camp David Accords, into the Arab
fold (Robins 2004, 176-177).
As a formal ally of Iraq, with close relations with the Gulf states, the Jordanian regime
was concerned over the growing dispute between Iraq and Kuwait which emerged after the close
of the Iran-Iraq war. Baghdad had several reasons for dispute with its smaller neighbor to the
Southeast. The longest standing disagreement pertained to the legitimacy of the 1923 border
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