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Jordan and the Gulf Wars: Determining Hashemite Foreign Policy in 1990-91 and 2003
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Mediterranean. While these details are “secret” as far as Jordanian and American officials are concerned, they are well-known to many Jordanian citizens, who observed American F-16s taking off from the Azraq airbases (Keilani 2006). Solving the Puzzle: Factors Underlying Jordanian Foreign Policy in the Gulf Wars
Having surveyed the contours of Jordanian foreign policy in the first and second Gulf
wars, we continue by examining the factors which guided those policy choices. The most prominent variables are all found at the domestic level of analysis. The three factors which are highlighted in the section which follows are: public opinion, the impact of which has varied depending on levels of liberalization in Jordan; the economics of aid and trade, which have become more salient under the reign of King Abdallah; and leadership, particularly the role of Abdallah’s father, King Hussein. Public Opinion & Degrees of Liberalization
The contention that public opinion can impact foreign policy in authoritarian regimes is a
controversial one. Most examinations of the nexus between public opinion and foreign policy focus on liberal democratic states, not daring to test the conventional wisdom that public opinion “does not count” in autocratic contexts (Risse-Kappen 1991, 512). The assumption that Arab leaders are able to ignore public opinion or manipulate it to their will is belied by the fact, noted by Telhami (1993, 439), that these rulers “act as though” public opinion matters. He adds that:
This judgment is historically valid, as witnessed by the popular revolution against an entrenched shah in Iran; the popular uprisings across the Middle East in the 1950s that helped topple several Arab governments; massive food riots in Egypt, Jordan, and Tunisia, all of which were followed by consequential policy shifts; and the apparent increase in the political power of social and religious movements.
If we accept the premise that public opinion can matter in shaping the foreign policies of Arab states, that still leaves us with the question of when public opinion is likely to emerge as a salient factor. In the case of Jordan, I will argue that public opinion played a strong role in propelling the Jordanian regime to side with Iraq in the first Gulf war. In the second Gulf war, however public opinion played a more modest role. Popular objection to the US-led war in Iraq did not prevent the Jordanian government from aiding the United States in the war, although sensitivity to popular sentiment did lead the government to keep its collaboration as secret as possible.
As for why we observe this difference in the impact of public opinion on Jordanian
foreign policy over time, I argue that changes in the domestic opportunity structure, due to differing levels of political liberalization during the two crises, are responsible. Just as Risse-Kappen (1991) found that differences in domestic structures across four liberal democracies led to disparities in the extent that public opinion impacted foreign policy in those countries, I posit that differences in Jordan’s domestic political structure over time affected the ability of domestic public opinion to shape Jordanian foreign policy in the two Gulf wars. This leaves the question of which segment of the public matters. Risse-Kappen (1991) distinguishes between 1) mass
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Mediterranean. While these details are “secret” as far as Jordanian and American officials are
concerned, they are well-known to many Jordanian citizens, who observed American F-16s
taking off from the Azraq airbases (Keilani 2006).
Solving the Puzzle: Factors Underlying Jordanian Foreign Policy in the Gulf Wars
Having surveyed the contours of Jordanian foreign policy in the first and second Gulf
wars, we continue by examining the factors which guided those policy choices. The most
prominent variables are all found at the domestic level of analysis. The three factors which are
highlighted in the section which follows are: public opinion, the impact of which has varied
depending on levels of liberalization in Jordan; the economics of aid and trade, which have
become more salient under the reign of King Abdallah; and leadership, particularly the role of
Abdallah’s father, King Hussein.
Public Opinion & Degrees of Liberalization
The contention that public opinion can impact foreign policy in authoritarian regimes is a
controversial one. Most examinations of the nexus between public opinion and foreign policy
focus on liberal democratic states, not daring to test the conventional wisdom that public opinion
“does not count” in autocratic contexts (Risse-Kappen 1991, 512). The assumption that Arab
leaders are able to ignore public opinion or manipulate it to their will is belied by the fact, noted
by Telhami (1993, 439), that these rulers “act as though” public opinion matters. He adds that:
This judgment is historically valid, as witnessed by the popular revolution against
an entrenched shah in Iran; the popular uprisings across the Middle East in the
1950s that helped topple several Arab governments; massive food riots in Egypt,
Jordan, and Tunisia, all of which were followed by consequential policy shifts;
and the apparent increase in the political power of social and religious
movements.
If we accept the premise that public opinion can matter in shaping the foreign policies of Arab
states, that still leaves us with the question of when public opinion is likely to emerge as a salient
factor. In the case of Jordan, I will argue that public opinion played a strong role in propelling
the Jordanian regime to side with Iraq in the first Gulf war. In the second Gulf war, however
public opinion played a more modest role. Popular objection to the US-led war in Iraq did not
prevent the Jordanian government from aiding the United States in the war, although sensitivity
to popular sentiment did lead the government to keep its collaboration as secret as possible.
As for why we observe this difference in the impact of public opinion on Jordanian
foreign policy over time, I argue that changes in the domestic opportunity structure, due to
differing levels of political liberalization during the two crises, are responsible. Just as Risse-
Kappen (1991) found that differences in domestic structures across four liberal democracies led
to disparities in the extent that public opinion impacted foreign policy in those countries, I posit
that differences in Jordan’s domestic political structure over time affected the ability of domestic
public opinion to shape Jordanian foreign policy in the two Gulf wars. This leaves the question
of which segment of the public matters. Risse-Kappen (1991) distinguishes between 1) mass
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