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Vetoing Resolution: How External States Prolong Civil Wars
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Vetoing Resolution:
How External States can Prolong Civil Wars
David Cunningham
Olin Institute for Strategic Studies
Harvard University
## email not listed ##
Prepared for Presentation at the
Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association
Philadelphia, PA
September 1, 2006
Draft: Please do not cite without permission
Abstract: What explains the effect of external intervention on the duration of civil war? The literature on external intervention has made some progress in addressing this question but it has been hindered by an assumption that states intervene in civil wars either to help one side win or to facilitate negotiations. Often, however, external states become involved in civil war to pursue some independent agenda. When states intervene in this fashion, they will make wars more difficult to resolve for two reasons: doing so introduces another actor that must approve any settlement to end the war, and external states generally have less incentive to negotiate than internal actors. Quantitative analysis of the effect of type of intervention on the duration of all civil wars begun since World War II provides support for the theory that external interventions with an independent agenda lead to longer wars. Acknowledgements: I would like to thank Scott Gates, T. David Mason, and Barbara F. Walter for comments on this paper.
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| | Authors: Cunningham, David. |
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Vetoing Resolution:
How External States can Prolong Civil Wars
David Cunningham
Olin Institute for Strategic Studies
Harvard University
## email not listed ##
Prepared for Presentation at the
Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association
Philadelphia, PA
September 1, 2006
Draft: Please do not cite without permission
Abstract: What explains the effect of external intervention on the duration of civil war? The
literature on external intervention has made some progress in addressing this question but it has
been hindered by an assumption that states intervene in civil wars either to help one side win or to
facilitate negotiations. Often, however, external states become involved in civil war to pursue some
independent agenda. When states intervene in this fashion, they will make wars more difficult to
resolve for two reasons: doing so introduces another actor that must approve any settlement to end
the war, and external states generally have less incentive to negotiate than internal actors.
Quantitative analysis of the effect of type of intervention on the duration of all civil wars begun
since World War II provides support for the theory that external interventions with an independent
agenda lead to longer wars.
Acknowledgements: I would like to thank Scott Gates, T. David Mason, and Barbara F. Walter for
comments on this paper.
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