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External states intervening in conflicts can meet all three of these conditions. External states
are generally more cohesive than rebel groups and can present a unified set of demands.
8
As
described above, external states intervening to change the outcome of the conflict have preferences
that are at least somewhat different from the domestic combatants. External states often have
armies that are quite strong compared to the domestic insurgent groups and if they are strong
enough to continue the conflict unilaterally they count as veto players.
External interventions, therefore, can increase the number of actors that can block
agreement, which can make resolving the conflict substantially more difficult. This, in turn, can lead
conflicts to be longer.
Analyzing the effect of this type of external intervention on the duration of civil war requires
answering two related questions. First, what factors affect the decision by external states to intervene
in civil wars to change the outcome? Second, how does the presence of an external state with the
ability to block agreement affect bargaining in the conflict? I will address each of these questions.
Why Intervene?
If, as I am arguing, external interveners with independent agendas make civil wars
substantially more difficult to resolve, why do states intervene in this fashion? There are a host of
reasons that external states may intervene in civil war to pursue independent goals. They may
become involved out of a desire to control territory. When Libya sent its military into Chad in the
1970s, it annexed the Aouzou Strip, an area of northern Chad that was rumored to possess uranium.
This annexation led Libya into conflict both with the government of Chad and with several of the
insurgent groups that were seeking to take control of the country. Interventions may arise out of a
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The importance of organizational cohesiveness can be seen with regards to Rwanda’s participation in the conflict in the
DRC. Rwanda had a relatively small number of troops (perhaps as few as 5,000) relative to the other actors in the
conflict. However, Rwanda’s army was combat-experienced, well-trained, and extremely well-organized, and
consequently the small force was able to control about a third of the territory of the DRC.
Convention