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A Conditional Probability Analysis of Pattern-Based Models Applied to Event Data in the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict
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Schrodt and Hudson
Page 8
events generally display quite difference characteristics, which we would expect to see. Finally, in allof the cases, the probabilities vary over time, and in many instances, these changes correspondclosely to the major political epochs of the conflict: the invasion of Lebanon, the first intifada, theOslo negotiations, and the al-Aqsa intifada.
Conflict
Figure 2 shows the conditional probability differences for the simple count of the conflict events.The PI line involves conflict directed from the Palestinians to the Israelis; IP is conflict directedfrom the Israelis to the Palestinians. These are basically probabilities of events rather than patterns.
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Perhaps surprisingly, these differences are generally relatively low compared to some of those inthe later charts, and for material conflict, the difference goes to almost zero during the al-Aqsaintifada period. This initially counter-intuitive result is largely a function of the high marginalprobability of material conflict in this dyad: because the dyad generally sees a high level of conflictthroughout the period, the additional information provided by conditioning on conflict is low. Aninteresting example of this are the two spikes in Figure 2a, which occur in the period betweenIsrael’s withdrawal to south of the Litani in Lebanon and the outbreak of the first intifada, which isgenerally a very quiet period in the dyad. Only here do we see an isolated high conditionaldifference on the Israeli side, with Israel responding strongly to the small number of Palestinianuses of material conflict.
The verbal conflict graph shows a clear concentration of high differences during the period of theOslo process, roughly 1992 to mid-2000. However, even during this period the differences arerelatively low, in the range of 0.1 to 0.3. Atypically, the verbal conflict differences show a number ofnegative values in the period prior to the first intifada (December 1987), and the pattern generallylooks consistent with random fluctuations around zero. Consequently, in contrast with materialconflict, verbal conflict offers no predictive value for anticipating verbal conflict by the other side.
Cooperation
The graphs for cooperative events shown in Figure 3 are quite different than those for conflict.First, there are a far greater number of differences with high magnitude, hitting the range of 0.5 to0.7, indicating that the conditional probabilities are substantially greater than those of the marginalprobabilities. This is probably due in large part to the fact that cooperative activity in this dyad ismuch rarer than conflictual activity: this means that the marginal probabilities Pr(Y) and Pr(X) arelow, which both raises the value of Pr(Y|X) due to the presence of Pr(X) in the denominator, and thevalue of the difference due to a smaller number being subtracted.
The pattern in Figure 3a is a bit counter-intuitive, since the high probabilities tend to correspondwith periods of conflict—Lebanon and the two intifadas—rather than to the Oslo period. The twocurves generally coincide, though the magnitudes of the differences for the Israeli actors are usuallymuch higher than those of the Palestinian. Compared to some of the later graphs, we do not see astrong positive relationship during the Oslo period, despite the general anecdotal sense that this wasa period of high cooperation.
The explanation for this probably lies in the nature of material cooperation in this dyad: it isprimarily cease-fires and prisoner deals, which coincide with conflict. While the Oslo process wassupposed to involve a lot of material cooperation, the fact that the process failed meant that relatively
7
Specifically, this analysis differs from a conflict tit-for-tat pattern—which at first reading it seems quite similar
to—in the following way: The TFT is looking at a specific, deterministic short-term response across a fourteen-day period, with a lag time between the “tit” by one side and the “tat” by the other. The conditional probability islooking at the aggregate likelihood of conflict behavior over a 120-day period, with no assumption that thebehavior of one side precedes the other.
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| | Authors: Schrodt, Philip. and Hudson, Valerie. |
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Schrodt and Hudson
Page 8
events generally display quite difference characteristics, which we would expect to see. Finally, in all
of the cases, the probabilities vary over time, and in many instances, these changes correspond
closely to the major political epochs of the conflict: the invasion of Lebanon, the first intifada, the
Oslo negotiations, and the al-Aqsa intifada.
Conflict
Figure 2 shows the conditional probability differences for the simple count of the conflict events.
The PI line involves conflict directed from the Palestinians to the Israelis; IP is conflict directed
from the Israelis to the Palestinians. These are basically probabilities of events rather than patterns.
7
Perhaps surprisingly, these differences are generally relatively low compared to some of those in
the later charts, and for material conflict, the difference goes to almost zero during the al-Aqsa
intifada period. This initially counter-intuitive result is largely a function of the high marginal
probability of material conflict in this dyad: because the dyad generally sees a high level of conflict
throughout the period, the additional information provided by conditioning on conflict is low. An
interesting example of this are the two spikes in Figure 2a, which occur in the period between
Israel’s withdrawal to south of the Litani in Lebanon and the outbreak of the first intifada, which is
generally a very quiet period in the dyad. Only here do we see an isolated high conditional
difference on the Israeli side, with Israel responding strongly to the small number of Palestinian
uses of material conflict.
The verbal conflict graph shows a clear concentration of high differences during the period of the
Oslo process, roughly 1992 to mid-2000. However, even during this period the differences are
relatively low, in the range of 0.1 to 0.3. Atypically, the verbal conflict differences show a number of
negative values in the period prior to the first intifada (December 1987), and the pattern generally
looks consistent with random fluctuations around zero. Consequently, in contrast with material
conflict, verbal conflict offers no predictive value for anticipating verbal conflict by the other side.
Cooperation
The graphs for cooperative events shown in Figure 3 are quite different than those for conflict.
First, there are a far greater number of differences with high magnitude, hitting the range of 0.5 to
0.7, indicating that the conditional probabilities are substantially greater than those of the marginal
probabilities. This is probably due in large part to the fact that cooperative activity in this dyad is
much rarer than conflictual activity: this means that the marginal probabilities Pr(Y) and Pr(X) are
low, which both raises the value of Pr(Y|X) due to the presence of Pr(X) in the denominator, and the
value of the difference due to a smaller number being subtracted.
The pattern in Figure 3a is a bit counter-intuitive, since the high probabilities tend to correspond
with periods of conflict—Lebanon and the two intifadas—rather than to the Oslo period. The two
curves generally coincide, though the magnitudes of the differences for the Israeli actors are usually
much higher than those of the Palestinian. Compared to some of the later graphs, we do not see a
strong positive relationship during the Oslo period, despite the general anecdotal sense that this was
a period of high cooperation.
The explanation for this probably lies in the nature of material cooperation in this dyad: it is
primarily cease-fires and prisoner deals, which coincide with conflict. While the Oslo process was
supposed to involve a lot of material cooperation, the fact that the process failed meant that relatively
7
Specifically, this analysis differs from a conflict tit-for-tat pattern—which at first reading it seems quite similar
to—in the following way: The TFT is looking at a specific, deterministic short-term response across a fourteen-
day period, with a lag time between the “tit” by one side and the “tat” by the other. The conditional probability is
looking at the aggregate likelihood of conflict behavior over a 120-day period, with no assumption that the
behavior of one side precedes the other.
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