2
Theoretical and Empirical Research on Position-taking and Valence Advantages
Since Downs (1957) formulated the spatial model as it applies to politics, a substantial body of
formal theoretical research has explored how the predictions of the spatial model change under different
conditions. Generally, the Downsian model predicts some degree of moderation even as assumptions
about the number of dimensions, the amount of information available to candidates and voters, the
proportion of swing voters in the electorate, and the kind of motivations driving candidates are relaxed
(e.g., Calvert 1985; Enelow and Hinich 1981, 1982; Hinich and Pollard 1981; Morton 1993; Sullivan and
Minns 1976; Wittman 1983).
Stokes (1963) critiqued the spatial model, arguing that candidates tend to take positions on
valence issues, and not positional issues. Further, others have shown that voters reward candidates
possessing non-policy advantages such as competence, honesty, and being free of scandal (Abramowitz
1988; Bishin, Stevens, and Wilson 2005; Clark 2005; Hayes 2005). Once these valence advantages are
added to the Downsian model, though, the predictions change. Ansolabehere and Snyder (2000)
theorized that valence advantages work as a moderating force in candidate positioning, though conclude
by arguing that valence advantages are primarily non-policy advantages such as the “personal vote” (p.
333). Specifically, the advantaged candidate will typically take positions closer to the median voter than
will the disadvantaged candidate, though this relationship is not necessarily linear. Groseclose (2001)
extended these results, proving that if the valence difference is large enough, the advantaged candidate
will actually diverge towards her ideal policy-motivated position, although the disadvantaged candidate
will still be the more extreme contender of the two. Adams and Merrill (2003) also formally show that
valence advantages can lead to divergence under some conditions. The theoretical implication of these
formal results is clear: a high valence advantage leads to divergence from the constituency, while a lower
advantage leads to convergence. While this particular implication is clear, the existing theories do not
identify what valence advantages might be or how encompassing they might be of incumbent’s non-
positional policies and characteristics. I argue that any non-policy characteristic considered beneficial to
an incumbent—and any issue that is conceived by voters in valence terms—will lead to the predictions of
Convention