have suffered an out-of-pocket loss which is definitely determinable, through
no fault or negligence on their part, and the Government has correspondingly
been unjustly enriched.” The Treasury Department, Department of Justice,
and Bureau of the Budget recommended vetoing the private bill for relief.
In his April 21, 1949 veto message returning H.R. 1036, President Truman
made the analogy between tobacco stamps and both currency and postage
stamps, noting that a claim for redemption can only be granted if the items
are submitted in recognizable form for replacement. He contended that
“to permit such claims on the basis of mere affidavits would open the door
to many frauds against the Government.” He also cited eight similar requests
for relief which had recently been rejected by the federal government “for failure
to comply with the strict administrative requirements.” The House of
Representatives overrode the veto of the private bill on May 18 by a 318-39
vote. Almost four months later, on September 15, the Senate joined in passing
the law over President Truman’s veto by a 45-6 vote.
Conclusion: Trouble and Triumph
According to Richard Conley (2000, p. 223), President Truman’s “strategic
disengagement from leadership of Congress was shaped by the ideological
fragmentation in the Democratic Party prevalent in the late 1940s that combined
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Convention