1989). McCoy (1984, p. 93) asserts that Truman “believed that he could command
the necessary support in Congress for most of his foreign-policy initiatives, which
would prove to be the case.”
A second feature of the Truman administration’s relations with Congress
pertained to the White House staff structure. During his first four years in office,
President Truman “used the telephone a great deal to untangle knots on Capitol
Hill” (Donovan, 1977, p. 271). Though he had assistants who were charged with
drafting legislative proposals, the practice of appointing White House staff whose
served as permanent liaisons to Congress “began later in the Eisenhower
administration, although Truman made an approach to it in his second term”
(Donovan, 1977, p. 271).
A third feature of President Truman’s relations with Congress was his
conscious decision not to punish Southern Democrats who voted against his
domestic proposals. According to McCoy (1984, p. 165), this tactic backfired on
the chief executive, as it allowed the Dixiecrat defectors “to frustrate the
administration because they had retained their positions of power in the
congressional hierarchy.”
As much as he got upset with legislative opposition to his policies,
President Truman seemed to understand the nature of Congress as an
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Convention