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Explaining Agency Budget Choices: Are Disciplined Decisions (Actual Requests) Affected More by Administrator’s Aspirations (Decision Premises) or by Political Principals’ Priorities (Executive-Legislative Preferences)?

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Abstract:

Using the 1998 American State Administrator Project (ASAP) survey, we explore whether state agency budget requests are affected more by administrator’s aspirations or by the policy priorities of their political principals. Our analysis indicates that bureaucrats’ budget aspirations increase bureaucrats’ budget requests, thus confirming the underlying assumption behind budget-maximizing bureaucrats. Our findings also suggest, however, that bureaucratic budget power is a bit exaggerated. The policy priorities of political principals exert a strong curbing power over bureaucrats’ budget requests especially when the monitoring capacity of the principals is enhanced by legislative professionalization or macro-budgeting, the executive budget, and lobbyists’ activities. We additionally found that bureaucrats are overly blamed for budget growth. What might have been agency assertiveness is partly attributable to legislative assertiveness and interest group pressures. Bureaucratic budget moderation recently is further explained by the longitudinal decline in bureaucrats’ budget aspirations.

Most Common Document Word Stems:

budget (255), agenc (231), state (204), request (129), bureaucrat (101), legisl (92), polit (67), 1 (56), administr (53), legislatur (53), increas (45), 2 (42), might (41), group (39), budgetari (39), prefer (39), j (38), inform (36), model (35), public (35), program (34),

Author's Keywords:

bureaucratic budget power, political principals' preferences, budget maximizing and minimizing
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Name: American Political Science Association
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http://www.apsanet.org


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MLA Citation:

Ryu, Jay., Bowling, Cynthia., Cho, Chung-Lae. and Wright, Deil. "Explaining Agency Budget Choices: Are Disciplined Decisions (Actual Requests) Affected More by Administrator’s Aspirations (Decision Premises) or by Political Principals’ Priorities (Executive-Legislative Preferences)?" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Marriott, Loews Philadelphia, and the Pennsylvania Convention Center, Philadelphia, PA, Aug 31, 2006 <Not Available>. 2013-12-16 <http://citation.allacademic.com/meta/p151886_index.html>

APA Citation:

Ryu, J. E., Bowling, C. J., Cho, C. and Wright, D. S. , 2006-08-31 "Explaining Agency Budget Choices: Are Disciplined Decisions (Actual Requests) Affected More by Administrator’s Aspirations (Decision Premises) or by Political Principals’ Priorities (Executive-Legislative Preferences)?" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Marriott, Loews Philadelphia, and the Pennsylvania Convention Center, Philadelphia, PA Online <PDF>. 2013-12-16 from http://citation.allacademic.com/meta/p151886_index.html

Publication Type: Proceeding
Abstract: Using the 1998 American State Administrator Project (ASAP) survey, we explore whether state agency budget requests are affected more by administrator’s aspirations or by the policy priorities of their political principals. Our analysis indicates that bureaucrats’ budget aspirations increase bureaucrats’ budget requests, thus confirming the underlying assumption behind budget-maximizing bureaucrats. Our findings also suggest, however, that bureaucratic budget power is a bit exaggerated. The policy priorities of political principals exert a strong curbing power over bureaucrats’ budget requests especially when the monitoring capacity of the principals is enhanced by legislative professionalization or macro-budgeting, the executive budget, and lobbyists’ activities. We additionally found that bureaucrats are overly blamed for budget growth. What might have been agency assertiveness is partly attributable to legislative assertiveness and interest group pressures. Bureaucratic budget moderation recently is further explained by the longitudinal decline in bureaucrats’ budget aspirations.

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Associated Document Available American Political Science Association

Document Type: PDF
Page count: 34
Word count: 10295
Text sample:
Explaining Agency Budget Choices: Are Disciplined Decisions (Actual Requests) Affected More by Administrator’s Aspirations (Decision Premises) or by Political Principals’ Priorities (Executive-Legislative Preferences)? Jay Eungha Ryu Department of Political Science Ohio University ryu@ohio.edu Cynthia J. Bowling Department of Political Science Auburn University bowlicj@auburn.edu Chung-Lae Cho Department of Public Administration Ewha University Seoul Korea clcho@ewha.ac.kr and Deil S. Wright Department of Political Science The University of North Carolina dswright@mindspring.com August 3 2006 Prepared for delivery at the 2006 Annual Meeting
0.0046 Federal aid Four-scale measure of agency reliance on federal funds 0.0913 0.1572 Per capita GSP Per capita Gross State Product 0.0001 < 0.0001 State spending growth Four year average of state expenditure growth rates 15.5736 0.0012 Agency 10 State functions on criminal justice 1.2654 0.0085 Agency 13 Other functions 1.0518 0.0300 Number of observations 853 (1 175) used (total observations) -2 Res Log Likelihood 3 696.8 34


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