(Page 19 of 28) - Games Real Governments Play. The European Union's Open Method of Coordination and the Claim of Policy Learning authored by Schattenmann, Marc.

MARC SCHATTENMANN

OPEN METHOD OF COORDINATION (2006 APSA)

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Deutsch famously said, comes down to being “the ability to afford not to learn” (Deutsch 1963:
111).

In conclusion, the pervasiveness of the power-struggle is the main theoretical argument for

being skeptical about the OMC’s potential to foster policy learning. I believe that Rhodes was right
on the mark when he admonished that “the issue of power should be at the forefront of our quest
to understand how and why new modes emerge and to evaluate their consequences for governabil-
ity, accountability, responsiveness and legitimacy” (Rhodes 2005: 6)

3.2.5.

Choosing among institutions: motives for preferring the OMC

To keep the issue of power in the foreground is also helpful when one returns to the question why
the OMC has been introduced in the first place and why governments might be interested to extend
its reach to even more policy areas. Just as behavior within institutions is influenced by considera-
tions of power, the choice of institutions themselves is never innocent. As Héritier has pointed out,
arguments offered by political transaction cost theory and principal agent theory, while plausible,
often “fail to take into account that, when choosing a mode of governance, actors are motivated not
only by the desire to bring the best possible policy result about, but they are also driven by another
important motive: the wish to preserve or strengthen their own institutional position” (Héritier
2003: 108)

Therefore, the age-old question applies: Cui bono? Who benefits? With regard to the new

modes of governance and the OMC in particular, the question is: Whose institutional interests are
furthered by their rise? The European Commission is a prime suspect for some: Scharpf interpreted
the entire White Paper on European Governance as reflecting the “institutional self-interest of the Com-
mission” (Scharpf 2001), and Héritier sees the OMC in particular as an attempt by the Commission
to make up for ground lost elsewhere (Héritier 2001: 2). But, as Schäfer’s already quoted argument
makes clear, the open method may be highly attractive for the member states, too (Schäfer 2002:
29). Clearly, what is needed is a systematic attempt to understand the reasons why and when the
OMC becomes the method of choice.

In order to analyze the choice between institutions, we can and should use the same framework

that we have used above to analyze the choices within institutions. As Diermeier and Krehbiel argue, a
“theory of institutions”, i.e. a theory that explains why certain institutional features come into exis-
tence, is “nothing else but an application of the institutional approach to the choice of institutions”
(Diermeier and Krehbiel 2003: 132). When we analyze the behavior of member states and other
participants within the OMC or the CM, we analyze the choices players make within a given game.
On this level (call it k), the game form is exogenous and cannot be altered by the players. But when
we analyze the choice that member states face between using the OMC or the CM, we analyze a
choice between different game forms. On this level (k+1), the game forms are no longer exogenous
and can be altered by the players. But of course, this second-level choice or meta-choice is con-
strained in certain ways, too, e.g. by the EC treaties. Therefore, we can apply the same analytical
framework.

This “Russian doll approach” to institutions (Diermeier and Krehbiel 2003: 132) has a number

of interesting features for an analysis of EU policy-making. Firstly, it is important to realize that the
actual or imputed results from the solution of “subgames” at k are very useful for analyzing the
choice decision-makers face at k+1. If the member states know from past experience or clever
analysis that a treatment of certain issues under the OMC procedures will further their national in-
terests more than a treatment under the CM procedures, they will push for an extension of the
OMC procedures to this policy area (and vice versa). And the good news for the policy-makers is