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A Cross-National Examination of the Strategic Defection Theory |
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Abstract:
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The last years have witnessed the development of a great body of literature about judicial independence. One of the most interesting and provocative theoretical arguments has been put forward by Helmke in the ‘Strategic Defection’ Theory. In a series of papers and conferences, and particularly in her influential book Courts under Constraints, Helmke develops a rational choice approach to the problem of judicial independence in unstable regimes. She theorized that Justices of the Argentinean Supreme Court shaped their decisions in cases involving the government, depending on the underlying political environment. She claimed that, under some specific conditions, justices decided against the incumbents because of constraints faced vis-à-vis the incoming government.
In our paper, we seek to develop the foundations of a cross-country study of the Strategic Defection theory. After outlining the basics of Helmke’s theory we examine a series of problems confronting the development of a thorough cross national test, including how to define “regime change”, defection from authoritarian versus democratic regimes, problems of information and measurement, the ‘inter-temporal conflict of interest’, identifying the key issues for the incoming government, the problem of determining whether judges’ votes express their sincere preferences rather than strategic concerns, and whether the assumption of a strong executive may be generalized to all relevant cases.
We seek to test Justices’ votes in National High Courts with judicial review jurisdiction in countries with a documented history of political instability. After developing an approach for a broad cross national study, we provide a preliminary analysis of decision making in the Philippines, Venezuela, South Africa, and Canada. All of these countries (except Canada) experienced some kind of regime change that has been previously documented and analyzed. Canada is included as a control to examine the level of support for the government in a stable democracy. The preliminary results provide some support for strategic defection theory in South Africa, but the case of the Philippines does not appear to be consistent with strategic defection theory. |
Most Common Document Word Stems:
govern (189), regim (152), case (132), judg (117), polit (105), court (103), defect (102), strateg (91), chang (90), helmk (74), judici (73), countri (72), theori (71), justic (61), power (52), year (44), analysi (44), import (42), prefer (39), suprem (39), may (39), |
Author's Keywords:
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courts, judicial, strategic behavior, strategic defection, comparative courts |
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Association:
Name: American Political Science Association URL: http://www.apsanet.org
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Citation:
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MLA Citation:
| Sanchez Urribarri, Raul. and Songer, Donald. "A Cross-National Examination of the Strategic Defection Theory" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Marriott, Loews Philadelphia, and the Pennsylvania Convention Center, Philadelphia, PA, Aug 31, 2006 <Not Available>. 2011-03-13 <http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p151998_index.html> |
APA Citation:
| Sanchez Urribarri, R. and Songer, D. R. , 2006-08-31 "A Cross-National Examination of the Strategic Defection Theory" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Marriott, Loews Philadelphia, and the Pennsylvania Convention Center, Philadelphia, PA Online <APPLICATION/PDF>. 2011-03-13 from http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p151998_index.html |
Publication Type: Proceeding Abstract: The last years have witnessed the development of a great body of literature about judicial independence. One of the most interesting and provocative theoretical arguments has been put forward by Helmke in the ‘Strategic Defection’ Theory. In a series of papers and conferences, and particularly in her influential book Courts under Constraints, Helmke develops a rational choice approach to the problem of judicial independence in unstable regimes. She theorized that Justices of the Argentinean Supreme Court shaped their decisions in cases involving the government, depending on the underlying political environment. She claimed that, under some specific conditions, justices decided against the incumbents because of constraints faced vis-à-vis the incoming government.
In our paper, we seek to develop the foundations of a cross-country study of the Strategic Defection theory. After outlining the basics of Helmke’s theory we examine a series of problems confronting the development of a thorough cross national test, including how to define “regime change”, defection from authoritarian versus democratic regimes, problems of information and measurement, the ‘inter-temporal conflict of interest’, identifying the key issues for the incoming government, the problem of determining whether judges’ votes express their sincere preferences rather than strategic concerns, and whether the assumption of a strong executive may be generalized to all relevant cases.
We seek to test Justices’ votes in National High Courts with judicial review jurisdiction in countries with a documented history of political instability. After developing an approach for a broad cross national study, we provide a preliminary analysis of decision making in the Philippines, Venezuela, South Africa, and Canada. All of these countries (except Canada) experienced some kind of regime change that has been previously documented and analyzed. Canada is included as a control to examine the level of support for the government in a stable democracy. The preliminary results provide some support for strategic defection theory in South Africa, but the case of the Philippines does not appear to be consistent with strategic defection theory. |
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55 |
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15566 |
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| A Cross-National Examination of the ‘Strategic Defection’ Theory By Raul A. Sanchez Urribarri Department of Political Science University of South Carolina Columbia SC 29208 sanchezu@mailbox.sc.edu Donald R. Songer Department of Political Science University of South Carolina Columbia SC 29208 dsonger@sc.edu Paper presented at the 2006 American Political Science Association Meeting in Philadelphia PA. This is a first draft; please do not cite without permission from one of the authors. Please direct all correspondence to: University of South Carolina Department |
| All Government Cases Important Cases Time Period Defect Support N Defect Support N ____________________________________________________________________________ Apartheid Government 43.4% 56.6% 592 49.2% 50.8% 59 Transition 57.6 42.4 99 63.8 36.7 47 Majority Rule Government 42.2 57.8 116 38.7 61.3 31 ______________________________________________________________________________ Chi Square = 7.29 5.02 Df = 2 2 Prob <.02 P = .08 Cramer’s V = 0.10 0.19 |
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