Previous Research
While questions about mobilization have a long pedigree (Eldersveld 1956; Gosnell
1927; Kramer 1970; Miller et al. 1981), there has been a surge of interest in the last decade and a
half. The catalyst was Rosenstone and Hansen’s (1993) contention that the puzzle of declining
turnout despite rising levels of education and the breaking down of administrative barriers to
voting was primarily caused by the decline of mobilization efforts by the major parties: “People
participate in electoral politics in all of its forms when they are mobilized to do so. When
political mobilization falls, so does the propensity of people to take part” (227). In other words,
because political participation is contingent on motivation, engagement, and resources (Verba,
Schlozman, and Brady 1995), mobilization efforts are effective because they increase motivation
and engagement.
Rosenstone and Hansen argue that it is not that mobilization changes what its targets
think about candidates or the election but that it subsidizes the costs of acquiring information
about the election, such as when and where to register and vote, and that it both exploits social
networks in an effort to create a sense of obligation to vote and creates new social connections
for the same end. In short, mobilization lowers the costs and increases the benefits of voting.
Along with earlier work by Wolfinger and Rosenstone (1980), Verba, Schlozman, and
Brady (1995) and Rosenstone and Hansen (1993) also demonstrate that while voting is at least
theoretically open to all, political mobilization is concentrated on individuals with time, money
and political skills. Correlates with mobilization are therefore individual characteristics like
education, partisan intensity, political knowledge, income, race and ethnicity, age, and a strong
sense of political efficacy. The result is an aggregate decline in turnout and a growing disparity
in the resources and skills of those who vote compared to those who stay at home on election
day.
4
Convention