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La Regle du Jeu: France and the Paradox of Managed Globalization
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Other consequences of the codification of the norms of trade openness and
capital liberalization have followed, and it is not clear that such effects were intended or even anticipated. These newly liberal rules have constitutive consequences, defining the very practices that define what “developed” and “European” states are. These rules have thereby delimited the boundaries of legitimate policy making, and many of the traditional tools of the post‐war Left – selective protectionism, capital controls, and the like – have through the process of codifying and managing globalization become illegitimate for those countries that seek to be recognized as full members of the international community. The “script” for “developed” and “European” policy makers has been, as a consequence, rewritten.
92
After the collapse of state socialism during the
late 1980s and early 1990s, those central and east European states that looked toward the OECD and EU for guidance on how to organize their economies found a collection of practices and rules that were more liberal even than those in which the post‐war world economy had flourished during the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s. Central and east European policy makers eagerly embrace these norms not because Paris and Brussels demanded, but because the definitions and scripts already were clear. Compliance was necessary for recognition and, ultimately, for membership, as the OECD and EU expanded during the 1990s and early years of the new century.
Thus, the doctrine of managed globalization created a world economy that is
more democratic and consensual, governed by international organizations in which European and developing countries at least have some voice and influence. But the very rules that empower those organizations have helped to delegitimize alternatives to a liberal orthodoxy that has since become less a collection of beliefs, and more a fact of law. The acquis is now also a mechanism for the expansion of liberalism. As goes Europe, so goes globalization.
92
See, for example, Frank Dobbin, “The Sociological View of the Economy,” in The New
Economic Sociology, ed. Frank Dobbin (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2004); and Michael Barnett and Martha Finnemore, Rules for the World: International Organizations in Global Politics (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2004).
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| | Authors: Abdelal, Rawi. and Meunier, Sophie. |
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31
Other consequences of the codification of the norms of trade openness and
capital liberalization have followed, and it is not clear that such effects were intended or
even anticipated. These newly liberal rules have constitutive consequences, defining the
very practices that define what “developed” and “European” states are. These rules
have thereby delimited the boundaries of legitimate policy making, and many of the
traditional tools of the post‐war Left – selective protectionism, capital controls, and the
like – have through the process of codifying and managing globalization become
illegitimate for those countries that seek to be recognized as full members of the
international community. The “script” for “developed” and “European” policy makers
has been, as a consequence, rewritten.
92
After the collapse of state socialism during the
late 1980s and early 1990s, those central and east European states that looked toward the
OECD and EU for guidance on how to organize their economies found a collection of
practices and rules that were more liberal even than those in which the post‐war world
economy had flourished during the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s. Central and east European
policy makers eagerly embrace these norms not because Paris and Brussels demanded,
but because the definitions and scripts already were clear. Compliance was necessary
for recognition and, ultimately, for membership, as the OECD and EU expanded during
the 1990s and early years of the new century.
Thus, the doctrine of managed globalization created a world economy that is
more democratic and consensual, governed by international organizations in which
European and developing countries at least have some voice and influence. But the very
rules that empower those organizations have helped to delegitimize alternatives to a
liberal orthodoxy that has since become less a collection of beliefs, and more a fact of
law. The acquis is now also a mechanism for the expansion of liberalism. As goes
Europe, so goes globalization.
92
See, for example, Frank Dobbin, “The Sociological View of the Economy,” in The New
Economic Sociology, ed. Frank Dobbin (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2004); and
Michael Barnett and Martha Finnemore, Rules for the World: International Organizations in Global
Politics (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2004).
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