Citation

The Politics of International Judicial Appointments: Evidence from the European Court of Human Rights

Abstract | Word Stems | Keywords | Association | Citation | Get this Document | Similar Titles




STOP!

You can now view the document associated with this citation by clicking on the "View Document as HTML" link below.

View Document as HTML:
Click here to view the document

Abstract:

Most theories of government-international court relations assume that judges share an interest in expanding the reach of their court. Yet, casual observation suggests that international judges vary considerably in their activist orientations and that governments are selective in choosing candidates for judicial appointments. This paper explores a new dataset of dissents in the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) to estimate the ideal points of judges. The results show that activism-restraint is indeed the main dimension of contestation among judges. Variation in judicial activism cannot be accounted for by different legal cultures of judges or by levels of domestic human rights observance in the judges’ countries of origins. There is robust evidence that aspiring European Union (EU) members use activist judicial appointments to signal human rights commitments. Moreover, there is some evidence that countries more favorably disposed towards EU integration and left-wing governments appoint more activist judges. These results suggest that politics matters in the appointment of international judges and that EU expansion was an important driving force behind the ECHR’s increased activism.

Most Common Document Word Stems:

judg (219), court (128), right (100), intern (91), govern (82), judici (77), polit (69), echr (69), countri (61), 1 (60), activist (60), human (58), european (56), activ (51), law (50), appoint (49), eu (47), case (45), model (44), legal (42), may (41),

Author's Keywords:

European Court of Human Rights, international law, international courts, ideal point estimation
Convention
All Academic Convention can solve the abstract management needs for any association's annual meeting.
Submission - Custom fields, multiple submission types, tracks, audio visual, multiple upload formats, automatic conversion to pdf.Review - Peer Review, Bulk reviewer assignment, bulk emails, ranking, z-score statistics, and multiple worksheets!
Reports - Many standard and custom reports generated while you wait. Print programs with participant indexes, event grids, and more!Scheduling - Flexible and convenient grid scheduling within rooms and buildings. Conflict checking and advanced filtering.
Communication - Bulk email tools to help your administrators send reminders and responses. Use form letters, a message center, and much more!Management - Search tools, duplicate people management, editing tools, submission transfers, many tools to manage a variety of conference management headaches!
Click here for more information.

Association:
Name: American Political Science Association
URL:
http://www.apsanet.org


Citation:
URL: http://citation.allacademic.com/meta/p152791_index.html
Direct Link:
HTML Code:

MLA Citation:

Voeten, Erik. "The Politics of International Judicial Appointments: Evidence from the European Court of Human Rights" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Marriott, Loews Philadelphia, and the Pennsylvania Convention Center, Philadelphia, PA, Aug 31, 2006 <Not Available>. 2013-12-16 <http://citation.allacademic.com/meta/p152791_index.html>

APA Citation:

Voeten, E. , 2006-08-31 "The Politics of International Judicial Appointments: Evidence from the European Court of Human Rights" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Marriott, Loews Philadelphia, and the Pennsylvania Convention Center, Philadelphia, PA Online <APPLICATION/PDF>. 2013-12-16 from http://citation.allacademic.com/meta/p152791_index.html

Publication Type: Proceeding
Abstract: Most theories of government-international court relations assume that judges share an interest in expanding the reach of their court. Yet, casual observation suggests that international judges vary considerably in their activist orientations and that governments are selective in choosing candidates for judicial appointments. This paper explores a new dataset of dissents in the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) to estimate the ideal points of judges. The results show that activism-restraint is indeed the main dimension of contestation among judges. Variation in judicial activism cannot be accounted for by different legal cultures of judges or by levels of domestic human rights observance in the judges’ countries of origins. There is robust evidence that aspiring European Union (EU) members use activist judicial appointments to signal human rights commitments. Moreover, there is some evidence that countries more favorably disposed towards EU integration and left-wing governments appoint more activist judges. These results suggest that politics matters in the appointment of international judges and that EU expansion was an important driving force behind the ECHR’s increased activism.

Get this Document:

Find this citation or document at one or all of these locations below. The links below may have the citation or the entire document for free or you may purchase access to the document. Clicking on these links will change the site you're on and empty your shopping cart.

Associated Document Available Political Research Online
Abstract Only All Academic Inc.
Associated Document Available American Political Science Association

Document Type: application/pdf
Page count: 46
Word count: 13519
Text sample:
The Politics of International Judicial Appointments: Evidence from the European Court of Human Rights Erik Voeten Assistant Professor of Political Science and International Affairs The George Washington University voeten@gwu.edu Abstract Most theories of government-international court relations assume that judges share an interest in expanding the reach of their court. Yet casual observation suggests that international judges vary considerably in their activist orientations and that governments are selective in choosing candidates for judicial appointments. This paper explores a new dataset
CHE V.Zagrebelsky ITA J.Gersing DNK A.B.Baka HUN P.Jambrek SVN L.Liesch LUX L.FerrariBravo SNM ThorVilhjalmsson ISL J.BorregoBorrego ESP F.Matscher AUT GeraldFitzmaurice GBR 44 0 .1 .4 -.1.2 .3 Mean-Activism-Restraint Figure 3: Temporal Change in Activism of ECHR Judges 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 Year bandwidth = .8 45


Similar Titles:
The European Court of Human Rights, Domestic Politics and the Ties that Bind: Explaining Compliance with International Human Rights Tribunals

What Motivates Judicial Behavior on International Courts? Evidence from the European Court of Human Rights

Appeals to International Human Rights Law in Constitutional Court Cases: Four European Cases


 
All Academic, Inc. is your premier source for research and conference management. Visit our website, www.allacademic.com, to see how we can help you today.