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regime (Cortright and Lopez 2000, 51, 1999, 735; Zunes 1998, 53). This project goes
through a two-step process to remedy this problem: defining compliance through
structured, focused comparison, and applying that definition to a spatial model that
allows for the analysis of relative, partial compliance.
As mentioned earlier, compliance with United Nations Security Council demands
by Iraq is more complex that a “yes” or “no” answer. Many of the demands are multi-
faceted. Most obviously, the United Nations Security Council incorporates biological,
chemical, and long-range weapons into one demand, though they are three different (but
related) issue areas. Likewise, return of Kuwaitis and other nationals are in one demand.
An end to sponsorship of terrorism is coupled with active political renunciation of
terrorist activities as a way to solve problems. The demand of Resolution 688, to “end
repression of the civilian population,” incorporates a number of demands about humyn
rights and fundamental freedoms.
In addition to the fundamental complexity of the demands, there are a wide-range
of aspects of compliance with each demand. For example, Iraq could destroy all
chemical and long-range weapons, but not all biological weapons. In another scenario, it
could destroy 95 percent of each type. The government of Iraq could destroy all
chemical weapons but keep the pre-cursor chemicals for redevelopment. It could
continue clandestine research and deve lopment while allowing for the current stockpile
of these weapons to be destroyed. Likewise, in relation to the demand about Kuwait’s
territorial integrity and international boundaries, Iraq could recognize Kuwait’s right to
exist without recognizing internationally declared boundaries. It could recognize neither
in its rhetoric, but decline to violate them. Iraq could invade Kuwait. It could also
Convention