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Though huma nitarian aspects of economic sanctions have been dealt with more
comprehensively, issues of empirical understandings of compliance remain largely
unexplored in the academic literature. Theoretical models of compliance causation are
well-developed, but empirical estimates remain less rigorous (Drezner 1999, 2000;
Baldwin 1985). Perhaps this lack of attention is owing to a consensus around Eric
Hoskins’ recognition of the methodological difficulties that such a project necessarily
entails (Hoskins 1997). In the exploration of Iraq’s compliance, questions of causality
are difficult if possible to resolve because of the plethora of possible intervening
variables (frequent bombings, for example). Official statements may have nothing to do
with actual causes, as rhetoric played a big role in this conflict. Because there were
important arguments for and against this sanctions regime, there is no clear and agreed
upon moral or policy ‘high ground.’ Further, the sanctions on Iraq were by far the most
comprehensive collective action ever taken by the United Nations Security Council,
leaving little room for comparison. Despite the complexities, however, the issue of
compliance in economic sanctions regimes is worth studying, particularly the sanctions
regime on Iraq. It serves two major purposes. First, studying compliance aids in
understanding what really happened during the decade of sanctions on Iraq and what that
means for international politics today. Second, it sheds light into the nature of the
relationships between the involved states, which, we argue, provides new evidence for
the importance of theories of IR which combine power and perception.
Yet, the methodological difficulties of assessing sanctions regimes remain. In the
case of Iraq, a number of intervening military conflicts, many domestic political changes,
an inconsistent pattern of governmental behavior, and changing political positions of
Convention