relations, furthermore, we see Internationalization and Domestic Politics, edited by Robert O.
Keohane and Helen Milner.
Even constructivism—a “new comer” in the family of international
relations theory, which focuses on the power of norms in international affairs—is no exception.
For example, Thomas Risse, Stephen Ropp, and Kathryn Sikkink have investigated the impact of
international norms on domestic politics in their The Power of Human Rights: International
Norms and Domestic Change.
The second-image-reversed line of thinking has even led to the
breaking-down of the domestic-international division, as we see in Double-Edged Diplomacy:
International Bargaining and Domestic Politics.
In short, Gourevitch’s 1978 is a modern clas-
sic.
Yet, to our surprise, the causal logic identified by Gourevitch and other well-known mod-
ern classic writers of “second image reversed” has not been scrutinized systematically; rather, it
has been taken for granted. The objective of this paper is to conduct such a re-examination. The
paper’s central argument is that the second-image-reversed thesis as formulated by these
“founders” is much more problematic as a set of causal arguments than we have long assumed.
These writers, besides Gourevitch, include such giants as Alexander Gerschenkron, Sir John See-
ley, and Otto Hintze.
More specifically, the paper will present three sets of findings. First, in his 1978 “mod-
ern classic” article, Gourevitch lists nine families of second-image-reversed theories. But only
two of those are credible enough. The rest have serious shortcomings in their causal logic,
whether conceptually or empirically—or both. Thus, the article is less than coherent and reliable
despite its status as a seminal piece of scholarship. Now, the other two findings of mine concern
these two most credible second-image-reversed arguments identified in Gourevitch’s article.
The first argument is called the Gerschenkronian thesis, named after the 1962 book published by
Alexander Gerschenkron, Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective. It posits that late
industrialization or a less competitive position in the international economic system (when a
country joins that system) leads to a centralized state. The second argument, called the Seeley-
Hintze law, stipulates that the harsher the international environment a state faces, the more likely
that an authoritarian or militaristic system will emerge in that state.
5
Cambridge University Press, 1996. Another source in this line is Keohane and Nye (2001).
6
Cambridge University Press, 1999.
7
Edited by Peter Evans, Harold Jacobson, and Robert Putnam (University of California Press, 1993).
3