transnational relations, modernization and interdependence school,” and finally “the neo-mer-
cantilists and state-centered Marxists.” Gourevitch gives us an impression that all of these theor-
ies are second-image-reversed arguments, but this treatment by him is highly problematic: they
are all conceptually unsound. In the first place, given our definition of second-image-reversed
arguments that was mentioned earlier, only the Gersenkronian thesis and dependency theory by
Wallerstein represent true second-image-reversed theses among these cases. The rest do not re-
gard international factors as “decisively dominant forces” toward domestic factors. Some even
are not second-image-reversed arguments at all! For example, imperialism arguments developed
by Hobson and Lenin are in fact cases of second image arguments as Kenneth Waltz persuas-
ively argues in his Theory of International Politics (1979). Furthermore, Gourevitch’s treatment
of liberal development, interdependence, neo-mercantilism and state-centered Marxists as
second-image-reversed arguments is not convincing. In fact, in these theories, domestic forces
may be as strong as international forces—neo-mercantilism and state-centered Marxists are the
extreme cases as they are clearly second-image arguments.
Thus, we are left with Gersenkronian thesis and dependency theory. Between the two,
the latter as a second-image-reversed argument has a serious weakness. That is, it is difficult to
ascertain empirically the very causal mechanisms advanced by dependency theory. This is the
basic conclusion that Anthony Brewer reaches in his book entitled, Marxist Theories of Imperi-
alism: A Critical Survey (1980, see especially p. 273). We thus have only the Gersenkronian
thesis as the most credible case of “second image reversed” as far as the IPE theme is concerned.
Now, let us turn our attention to the IS theme developed by Gourevitch. He summarizes
it as follows:
The anarchy of the international environment poses a threat to states within it: the
threat of being conquered, occupied, annihilated or made subservient. The ob-
verse of the threat is opportunity: power, dominion, empire, glory, “total" secur-
ity. This state of war induces states to organize themselves internally so as to
meet these external challenges. War is like the market: it punishes some forms of
organization and rewards others. The vulnerability of states to such pressures is
not uniform since some occupy a more exposed position than others. Hence, the
pressure for certain organizational forms differs. The explanation for differential
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