wholes actually existing in the real world. The social world, Weber insisted, is infinitely
rich in atomic details that are in constant flux. The social entities that characterize so
much of 19th century social theory, he insisted, do not exist in the same way trees and
stones do. They result from imposition of the social scientist's perspective upon the
infinite richness and constant flux of social reality .
Ideal types, Weber insisted, are
not descriptions of objects existing in the real world. They are, rather, instruments
which the social scientist creates for purposes of investigating the social world.
Yet as it happened with Marx, Weber's very efforts to avoid reification allow a
new form of reification to creep in the back door. Social scientists may think they they
understand Weber's methodological recommendations. Nevertheless, they still incline
to treat ideal types like bureaucracy, totalitarianism, types of authority, etc., as if they
referred to entities that really exist independently of interpretation.
Social scientists are trained to be sensitive to the fact that ideal types are artificial
constructs that pick out, indeed exaggerate certain aspects of social reality. This does
not, however, put a stop to the inexorable tendency to reify them. The warning that
ideal types are merely constructs, that they do not correspond to real things in a real
world is apparently not adequate. The disposition to reify is too deeply-rooted simply to
evaporate by being exposed. Therefore, before proceeding further in our examination
of the reifying tendency in Weber's ideal typical method, I propose to take a closer look
at sources of the general inclination to confuse the constructs we use in making sense
of reality with reality itself.
10
Weber, Methodology, p. 111; Roscher and Knies: The Logical
Problems of Historical Economics, translated with an
introduction by Guy Oakes (New York: The Free Press, 1975), pp.
55-80.
11
Weber, Methodology, p.90.
Convention