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Eadem Sed Aliter: Religious Voting in Spain and Portugal
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ideology in predicting party choice is not as stronger in Portugal, it still appears as a formidable variable with
ample capacity to explain electoral preferences (Freire 2001).
Ideology is a particularly sensitive topic in any discussion of religiosity and electoral behaviour. Because it
occurs causally later than most of the independent variables included in conventional regression models, it very
often robes much of the effect of some independent variables on the vote. This has been documented to take
place, for instance, in the case of class voting; in that case, ideology assumes a great deal of the direct effect of
social class on party choice (Bartle 1998). Class, however, exerts an indirect, yet powerful still, effect on
voting (Evans 1999; García de Polavieja 2001). Of course failing to acknowledge the distinction between direct
and indirect effects can give way to misleading interpretations of the results. Particularly in those cases where
religious identities are strongly correlated with ideological positions, the effect of ideology can lead us to
believe that religiosity is not influential when, in reality, it is so (Calvo and Montero 2002). Precisely as a way
to highlight the disruptive effect of ideology, we will show the models in a twofold format: firstly with ideology
included (“full model” henceforth), then without.
5
Also, ideology, this time as a dependent variable, will be
regressed on a number of variables, including religiosity. With that we hope to demonstrate that the individual
location in the left-right scale has much to do with his or her religiosity.
The following equations summarize our models:
SPAIN
Equation (1) Y(Voto PSOE1982) = f(Attendace2, Attendance3, Attendance4, Attendance5, Abortion1
Ideology, Gonzalez’sTher, control variables, ε).
Equation (2) Y(Voto AP1982) = f(Attendace2, Attendance3, Attendance4, Attendance5, Abortion1
Ideology, Fraga’sTher, control variables, ε).
Equation (3) Y(Voto PSOE2004) = f(Attendance2, Attendance 3, Attendance4, Attendance5,
Attendance6, Abortion1, Ideology, Zapatero’sTher, EconomicPerform, control variables, ε).
Equation (4) Y(Voto PP2004) = f(Attendance2, Attendance 3, Attendance4, Attendance5, Abortion1
Attendance6, Attendance7, Ideology, Rajoy’sTher, EconomicPerform, control variables, ε).
PORTUGAL
Equation (5) Y(Voto PS1983) = f(Attendace2, Attendance3, Attendance4, Attendance5, Ideology,
Soares’Ther, control variables, ε).
Equation (6) Y(Voto PSD1983) = f(Attendace2, Attendance3, Attendance4, Attendance5, Ideology,
Machete’sTher, control variables, ε).
Equation (7) Y(Voto PS2002) = f(Attendace2, Attendance3, Attendance4, Attendance5, Attendance6,
Abortion1 deology, Rodrigues’Ther, control variables, ε).
5
The models also include a number of control variables. These are evaluation of economic performance (for Spain-1982 and
2004 and for Portugal-2002), occupational status, family income, education, age, gender, and community size.
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| | Authors: Montero, Jose., Calvo, Kerman. and Martinez, Alvaro. |
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9
ideology in predicting party choice is not as stronger in Portugal, it still appears as a formidable variable with
ample capacity to explain electoral preferences (Freire 2001).
Ideology is a particularly sensitive topic in any discussion of religiosity and electoral behaviour. Because it
occurs causally later than most of the independent variables included in conventional regression models, it very
often robes much of the effect of some independent variables on the vote. This has been documented to take
place, for instance, in the case of class voting; in that case, ideology assumes a great deal of the direct effect of
social class on party choice (Bartle 1998). Class, however, exerts an indirect, yet powerful still, effect on
voting (Evans 1999; García de Polavieja 2001). Of course failing to acknowledge the distinction between direct
and indirect effects can give way to misleading interpretations of the results. Particularly in those cases where
religious identities are strongly correlated with ideological positions, the effect of ideology can lead us to
believe that religiosity is not influential when, in reality, it is so (Calvo and Montero 2002). Precisely as a way
to highlight the disruptive effect of ideology, we will show the models in a twofold format: firstly with ideology
included (“full model” henceforth), then without.
5
Also, ideology, this time as a dependent variable, will be
regressed on a number of variables, including religiosity. With that we hope to demonstrate that the individual
location in the left-right scale has much to do with his or her religiosity.
The following equations summarize our models:
SPAIN
Equation (1) Y(Voto PSOE1982) = f(Attendace2, Attendance3, Attendance4, Attendance5, Abortion1
Ideology, Gonzalez’sTher, control variables, ε).
Equation (2) Y(Voto AP1982) = f(Attendace2, Attendance3, Attendance4, Attendance5, Abortion1
Ideology, Fraga’sTher, control variables, ε).
Equation (3) Y(Voto PSOE2004) = f(Attendance2, Attendance 3, Attendance4, Attendance5,
Attendance6, Abortion1, Ideology, Zapatero’sTher, EconomicPerform, control variables, ε).
Equation (4) Y(Voto PP2004) = f(Attendance2, Attendance 3, Attendance4, Attendance5, Abortion1
Attendance6, Attendance7, Ideology, Rajoy’sTher, EconomicPerform, control variables, ε).
PORTUGAL
Equation (5) Y(Voto PS1983) = f(Attendace2, Attendance3, Attendance4, Attendance5, Ideology,
Soares’Ther, control variables, ε).
Equation (6) Y(Voto PSD1983) = f(Attendace2, Attendance3, Attendance4, Attendance5, Ideology,
Machete’sTher, control variables, ε).
Equation (7) Y(Voto PS2002) = f(Attendace2, Attendance3, Attendance4, Attendance5, Attendance6,
Abortion1 deology, Rodrigues’Ther, control variables, ε).
5
The models also include a number of control variables. These are evaluation of economic performance (for Spain-1982 and
2004 and for Portugal-2002), occupational status, family income, education, age, gender, and community size.
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