(Page 9 of 26) - Gender and Constitutional Change in the UK: substantive representation and domestic abuse policy in Scotland authored by Mackay, Fiona.

Recognition as representation

Recognition is integral to representation and citizenship. Although Fraser’s (1995,
2003) discussions of the requirements of social justice do not explicitly use the
framework of representation or citizenship, the general principles serve us well by
emphasising the links between (in) equality and women’s agency. Social justice –
alternatively understood as substantive representation and consequently substantive
citizenship – requires the combination of recognition (including cultural rights) and
redistribution (social and economic rights) in order to be able to meet conditions for
the norm ‘of participatory parity’ (Fraser 2003, 29-31). Women’s citizenship, defined
as agency to participate as peers in social and political spheres, is constrained by
‘gender-specific forms of distributive injustice including gender-based exploitation,
economic marginalisation and deprivation’ and gender-specific forms of
misrecognition and status subordination, particularly ‘institutionalized patterns of
cultural value that privileges traits associated with masculinity, while devaluing
everything coded as “feminine”, paradigmatically - but not only – women.’ (Fraser
2003, 20).

The criterion of ‘recognition’ therefore relates to questions of the extent to which
post devolution institutions and politics recognise – at a symbolic level – the full
political and social citizenship of women: to what extent have the gendered
implications of policy or gender-based barriers to full citizenship been recognised?
Are women seen as legitimate political actors with legitimate interests and
differentiated interests and concerns? Or are they ‘misrecognised’ and subject to ‘non-
recognition (being rendered invisible via authoritative representational,
communicative and interpretative practices of one’s own culture); and disrespect [ed]
(being routinely maligned or disparaged in stereotypical public cultural representative
and/or everyday life interactions [?])’ (Fraser 1995, 71). As Lovenduski points out,
masculinist ideologies are ‘central to the workings of public institutions and therefore
to political life, conventionally defined’ (1998, 340) and dominant masculinities are
presented as commonsense, ostensibly gender-neutral norms, conventions and
practices. Fraser argues that institutions play a crucial role in the misrecognition, of
women. Therefore institutions (for our purposes, democratic institutions) need to
replace patterns of cultural norms that impede women’s ability to participate with
norms that foster parity of participation, (2003, 30) and recognition of multiple and
intersecting identities and inequalities.

Accountability structures and relationships

Goetz

(2003) cautions that there is a need to move away from an undue emphasis on

how women representatives – or even women’s civil society organisations – perform
and, instead, to take a more holistic and institutionally-focussed approach. This
centres upon what accountability mechanisms and relationships exist to hold to
account government and other state actors with regards to their performance on issues
of gender equality (see also Sawer 2002) According to Goetz accountability
relationships on the one hand, serve to require power-holders to explain and justify
their actions and, on the other, impose sanctions and penalties. In other words they are
conventionally organised by the functions of answerability (‘soft’ accountability) and
enforceability (‘hard’ accountability). These accountability institutions and
relationships have traditionally been gender biased but institutional change and the
creation of new institutions can serve as an opportunity to counter and correct