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Everything but Trade: How a Protectionist House of Representatives Passed the United States-Central American-Dominican Republic Free Trade Agreement

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Abstract:

The ratification of CAFTA by the United States House of Representatives presents a situation in which supporters overcame an increasingly protectionist political climate in order to gain approbation. While interest groups frequently influence the politics of trade policy in the direction of protectionism, CAFTA represents a puzzle because the majority of defensive interests lost. This paper applies Christina Davis’s theory of institutionalized cross-sector linkages to Robert Putnam’s Level II negotiations to show how issue linkages and appropriations payoffs can overcome defensive interests opposed to free trade agreements. With the agreement initially thirty to forty votes short of ratification, CAFTA supporters combined the influence of the presidency with the appropriations and legislative power of the House leadership to shift members’ win sets and achieve ratification.

Most Common Document Word Stems:

trade (195), 2005 (119), cafta (114), interest (113), vote (97), support (79), presid (78), hous (74), agreement (60), congress (60), member (59), retriev (57), 2006 (56), polit (54), juli (50), p (47), issu (46), polici (42), negoti (40), bush (40), free (39),

Author's Keywords:

CAFTA, CAFTA-DR, DR-CAFTA, Central American Free Trade Agreement, Christina Davis, Robert Putnam
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Name: International Studies Association 48th Annual Convention
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http://www.isanet.org


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URL: http://citation.allacademic.com/meta/p180517_index.html
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MLA Citation:

Jergens, Collin. "Everything but Trade: How a Protectionist House of Representatives Passed the United States-Central American-Dominican Republic Free Trade Agreement" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the International Studies Association 48th Annual Convention, Hilton Chicago, CHICAGO, IL, USA, Feb 28, 2007 <Not Available>. 2016-06-06 <http://citation.allacademic.com/meta/p180517_index.html>

APA Citation:

Jergens, C. T. , 2007-02-28 "Everything but Trade: How a Protectionist House of Representatives Passed the United States-Central American-Dominican Republic Free Trade Agreement" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the International Studies Association 48th Annual Convention, Hilton Chicago, CHICAGO, IL, USA Online <APPLICATION/PDF>. 2016-06-06 from http://citation.allacademic.com/meta/p180517_index.html

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Abstract: The ratification of CAFTA by the United States House of Representatives presents a situation in which supporters overcame an increasingly protectionist political climate in order to gain approbation. While interest groups frequently influence the politics of trade policy in the direction of protectionism, CAFTA represents a puzzle because the majority of defensive interests lost. This paper applies Christina Davis’s theory of institutionalized cross-sector linkages to Robert Putnam’s Level II negotiations to show how issue linkages and appropriations payoffs can overcome defensive interests opposed to free trade agreements. With the agreement initially thirty to forty votes short of ratification, CAFTA supporters combined the influence of the presidency with the appropriations and legislative power of the House leadership to shift members’ win sets and achieve ratification.


Similar Titles:
CAFTA Politics: Civil Society Participation in Central American Free Trade Negotiations

Playing the Wedge Issue Card in a Polarized Congress: Vote-switching over China Trade Policy, 1990-2001

Political Alliance, Domestic Interests and Trade Policy-Making: A Case Study of Turkish-American Textile Trade Negotiations


 
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