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Association: Name: American Political Science Association URL: http://www.apsanet.org
Citation: URL: http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p209004_index.html Direct Link: HTML Code:

Lax, Jeffrey. and Rader, Kelly. "Tactical Opinion Assignment and Voting in the Supreme Court" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Hyatt Regency Chicago and the Sheraton Chicago Hotel and Towers, Chicago, IL, Aug 30, 2007 <Not Available>. 2011-06-08 <http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p209004_index.html>

Lax, J. R. and Rader, K. T. , 2007-08-30 "Tactical Opinion Assignment and Voting in the Supreme Court" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Hyatt Regency Chicago and the Sheraton Chicago Hotel and Towers, Chicago, IL Online <APPLICATION/PDF>. 2011-06-08 from http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p209004_index.html

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript Abstract: Supreme Court Justices often change their minds between the initial vote in their private conference and the final vote. We study what drives such changes, both for justices in the initial majority and those in the initial minority, and what this can teach us about what drives their voting in general. The initial vote also determines the initial majority coalition, within which the Chief Justice or other senior justice gets to assign the initial majority opinion draft. How does this choice affect the final votes cast in the case, given the justices initial positions? We test various hypotheses about how assignment tactics might affect voting. While these hypotheses date back to Murphy (1964), we gain new leverage on them using an improved research design which recognizes the strategic nature of such choices. We find that the nature of the case being decided, the ideological configuration of the initial majority, and justice characteristics all affect the likelihood of switching. We also show that assignment tactics strongly affect defections by justices in the initial majority as well as defection by justices in the initial minority from their original positions. These findings are discussed in light of recent theories of judicial choice and bargaining, raising new puzzles for future study.

Who Most Influences the Majority Opinion on the U.S. Supreme Court: Evaluating the Median-of-the-Majority-Coalition Hypothesis

Who Most Influences the Majority Opinion on the U.S. Supreme Court?: Evaluating the Median-of-the-Majority-Coalition Hypothesis

The Effect of Institutional Defects on the Congruence of Political Support of Ethnic Minorities and Majorities in Asian Defective Democracies