Author's Keywords: international conflict, civil war, bargaining theory of war	Convention All Academic Convention makes running your annual conference simple and cost effective. It is your online solution for abstract management, peer review, and scheduling for your annual meeting or convention. Submission - Custom fields, multiple submission types, tracks, audio visual, multiple upload formats, automatic conversion to pdf. Review - Peer Review, Bulk reviewer assignment, bulk emails, ranking, z-score statistics, and multiple worksheets! Reports - Many standard and custom reports generated while you wait. Print programs with participant indexes, event grids, and more! Scheduling - Flexible and convenient grid scheduling within rooms and buildings. Conflict checking and advanced filtering. Communication - Bulk email tools to help your administrators send reminders and responses. Use form letters, a message center, and much more! Management - Search tools, duplicate people management, editing tools, submission transfers, many tools to manage a variety of conference management headaches! Click here for more information.
Association: Name: American Political Science Association URL: http://www.apsanet.org
Citation: URL: http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p209203_index.html Direct Link: HTML Code:

Fearon, James. "Fighting Rather Than Bargaining" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Hyatt Regency Chicago and the Sheraton Chicago Hotel and Towers, Chicago, IL, Aug 30, 2007 <Not Available>. 2011-06-08 <http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p209203_index.html>

Fearon, J. D. , 2007-08-30 "Fighting Rather Than Bargaining" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Hyatt Regency Chicago and the Sheraton Chicago Hotel and Towers, Chicago, IL Online <APPLICATION/PDF>. 2011-06-08 from http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p209203_index.html

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript Abstract: If bargaining is understood to involve the continuous exchange of offers that have a positive chance of being accepted, then virtually all interstate and civil wars involve significant periods in which the combatants simply fight and do not bargain. Why don't they exchange serious offers in order to reduce the costs of war? I consider a model in which a government makes offers to a rebel group, and in which the government cannot commit not to revise its proposal downwards if the rebel group reveals its type by accepting an offer. I show that this "ratchet effect" can undermine the government's ability to screen "weak" types of rebel groups by making peace offers, forcing the government to use fighting to screen out weak types. In the model's equilibrium the government makes non-serious offers that neither type of rebel group will accept for a period of time. If the rebels survive this length of time, the government shifts to an offer that both types will accept and a self-enforcing peace begins.

Weak States, Strong States?: Post-Colonial Governance, Weak Class, and Strong Ethnicity in India

The Impact of Political Ideology and Government Structure on Information Technology Policy: A Comparison of Technologically Sophisticated Countries with Differing Types of Governments

Weak Democracy, Strong Information: The Role for Information Technology in the Rulemaking Process